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ABSTRACT 
TOWARDS SECURE AND SCALABLE TAG SEARCH APPROACHES FOR 
CURRENT AND NEXT GENERATION RFID SYSTEMS 
 
Farzana Rahman 
Marquette University, 2010 
The technology behind Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has been around for a 
while, but dropping tag prices and standardization efforts are finally facilitating the expansion of 
RFID systems. The massive adoption of this technology is taking us closer to the well known 
ubiquitous computing scenarios. However, the widespread deployment of RFID technology also 
gives rise to significant user security issues. One possible solution to these challenges is the use 
of secure authentication protocols to protect RFID communications. A natural extension of RFID 
authentication is RFID tag searching, where a reader needs to search for a particular RFID tag out 
of a large collection of tags. As the number of tags of the system increases, the ability to search 
for the tags is invaluable when the reader requires data from a few tags rather than all the tags of 
the system. Authenticating each tag one at a time until the desired tag is found is a time 
consuming process. Surprisingly, RFID search has not been widely addressed in the literature 
despite the availability of search capabilities in typical RFID tags. In this thesis, we examine the 
challenges of extending security and scalability issues to RFID tag search and suggest several 
solutions. 
This thesis aims to design RFID tag search protocols that ensure security and scalability 
using lightweight cryptographic primitives. We identify the security and performance 
requirements for RFID systems. We also point out and explain the major attacks that are typically 
launched against an RFID system. This thesis makes four main contributions. First, we propose a 
serverless (without a central server) and untraceable search protocol that is secure against major 
attacks we identified earlier. The unique feature of this protocol is that it provides security 
protection and searching capacity same as an RFID system with a central server. In addition, this 
approach is no more vulnerable to a single point-of-failure. Second, we propose a scalable tag 
search protocol that provides most of the identified security and performance features. The highly 
scalable feature of this protocol allows it to be deployed in large scale RFID systems. Third, we 
propose a hexagonal cell based distributed architecture for efficient RFID tag searching in an 
emergency evacuation system. Finally, we introduce tag monitoring as a new dimension of tag 
searching and propose a Slotted Aloha based scalable tag monitoring protocol for next generation 
WISP (Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform) tags. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) (see figure 1.1) is the classic pervasive 
computing technology. RFID is plugged as the replacement for traditional barcodes and its’ 
wireless identification capabilities promise to revolutionize our industrial, commercial, and 
medical experiences. What makes RFID unique is that it facilitates information gathering about 
physical objects easy. Information about RFID tagged objects can be read through physical 
barriers and from a distance. In line with Mark Weiser's concept of ubiquitous computing 
[Weiser93, Pervasive1, and Pervasive2], RFID tags could turn our interactions with computing 
infrastructure into something subconscious. 
 
Source: [Bocchetti08] 
Figure 1.1 Design of an RFID tag 
Each RFID system has three main components: tag, reader, and database. An RFID 
reader and an RFID tag communicate via a wireless radio communications channel. The base idea 
of an RFID technology is an automatic identification technique, which relies on storing and 
remotely retrieving data about objects we want to manage using RFID tags. Some popular 
applications of RFID are product tracking in a supply chain [Li07], toll payments [Mayes09], 
access control [Juels05b], patient recognition in hospitals [Juels05b], automatic vehicle 
identification [Juels05b], point of sale applications [Juels05b], library book administration 
[Juels05b], and e-passports [Juels05c].  
We envision that low-cost RFID will be attached to every object in our daily lives, from 
clothes, books, and pens, to very small objects such as pins and buttons. Annotating objects 
around us with tags gives us enormous advantage in connecting the physical world with the 
cyber-world so that people can easily obtain information about the environment and physical 
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objects. We believe that more powerful tags and readers in the future promise many more 
applications based on how we may use those tags. 
Unit cost per tag is a major consideration for RFID tags because some applications need 
low cost tags. Cost may be a secondary consideration in passports or credit cards because security 
is paramount and these devices may pass that cost on to the consumer without much concern. In 
an application like product tagging, cost is paramount, and the cost per tag needs to be low; 
otherwise, the benefits of RFID are outweighed by the cost. Securing RFID tags and providing 
privacy in consumer applications, while limiting cost per tag, has been the focus of much 
academic work. Due to the constraints on memory, power consumption, and amount of logic on 
RFID devices, standard cryptographic primitives are often unsuitable.  
In recent years, numbers of papers have been published providing solutions to RFID 
security and privacy challenges. One approach to addressing such privacy and security threats is 
to use a tag authentication scheme in which a tag is both identified and verified in a manner that 
does not reveal the tag identity to an attacker. However, RFID tags have limited computation 
power and storage because of the tag cost requirements. As a result, protocols for RFID systems 
should not only be designed to address privacy and security threats, but should also take into 
account the limited capabilities of RFID tags. 
1.1. Security and Scalability in RFID Infrastructures 
In this section, we explain the meaning of two important terms in perspective of RFID 
systems. These two terms are: Security and Scalability. Every RFID system must be secure 
enough to be used by mass level end users. Scalability of an RFID system is related to its 
performance and the RFID system must be scalable to satisfy the needs of large number of users. 
However, from RFID system’s perspective, it has been found in literature that security and 
scalability are two conflicting issues. 
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1.1.1. Security 
Security and privacy of data (and of consumers) is one of the major concerns that have 
hindered the adoption of RFID technology for many applications. The absence of protocols for 
privacy and security introduce concerns such as scanning and tracking, cloning, eavesdropping, 
and replay attacks. However, a major problem of designing cryptographically secure RFID 
protocols is the lack of computational resources on RFID tags. This prohibits the use of common 
cryptographic operations to enhance privacy and security in RFID infrastructures. Therefore 
RFID protocol designers need to keep in mind all the challenges to find some new lightweight 
alternatives. 
1.1.2. Scalability 
A protocol is said to be scalable if the number of nodes can be significantly increased 
without imposing an unacceptable workload on any entity in the network. The interpretation of 
scalability will vary depending on the context (and the size of the network). Any security protocol 
deployed in an RFID network should not significantly affect its scalability. In the context of 
secure RFID systems, we would typically require that the workload on the server, to complete a 
single transaction, should not be a linear function of the number of deployed RFID tags. 
1.2. Motivation 
Recent advances in wireless technologies and cost reductions in sensor industries are 
causing the entire world to shift toward broad adoption of radio frequency identification (RFID) 
technology. Considering the expanding nature of RFID applications, we believe, one important 
functionality that an RFID system should provide is tag search, where a reader can detect if a 
particular tag is present or not. To better understand the situation, we describe some scenarios: 
• Scenario 1-Container search within seaports: Usually there are hundreds and 
thousands of containers within a seaport. Containers are parked and stacked by hundreds of 
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employees and countless drivers who deliver containers from remote locations. Moreover, 
containers are also unloaded from ships in order to deliver them to different customers and 
locations. Whether a particular container has already been unloaded from the ship or not, whether 
a specific container has arrived at the seaport for shipment or not, are some of the major tasks 
performed within seaports. But it is quite impossible to search for a particular container manually. 
That is why seaports in different countries have long been searching for technologies that can 
identify specific containers and that can confirm the existence of containers within seaports. One 
solution to the aforementioned problem can be to use RFID tags for container identification. Now 
through the use of our serverless search protocols, it will be quite easy to search for a particular 
container by searching the tag. If a container’s tag id is known, then a search operation can be 
invoked with the id within the seaport. If the container is present within the seaport then 
according to our protocol, definitely that particular tag will reply. Thus we can be sure about the 
container’s existence. 
• Scenario 2-Product Search in a warehouse: Let us imagine a warehouse full of 
tagged items and a manager of the warehouse wants to know if a particular item is present in the 
warehouse or not. The manager can use a reader to query the tag attached to that item and listen 
for a correct response from the tag to detect the presence of the item. Using an authentication 
technique to securely identify the desired item is very inefficient as the reader has to authenticate 
each tag one at a time. However, using a search technique within the warehouse can make the 
entire operation secure, efficient and easy for the manager and the reader. 
Based on this example application, we define tag search problem and some other terms 
related to tag searching as follows: 
 Definition 1:  Tag Searching 
Tag Searching is a process invoked by an RFID reader to determine among a number of tags 
whether a particular one is present.  
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 Definition 2:  Target Tag or Desired Tag 
We define the tag being searched for as the Target Tag or Desired Tag. We assume 
that the reader knows the identity (id) of the target tag and therefore the reader can initiate a 
search with this id.  
(However, initiating the search with the tag id is not secure and therefore the reader 
needs to encrypt or apply some other techniques to make the search protocol secure) 
From the above mentioned two scenarios and definitions, it is easy to infer that tag 
searching poses challenge to security and privacy. A naive search protocol is that the reader 
broadcasts the id and the target tag sends back a response. However, this protocol involves severe 
privacy and security problems. For example, an adversary can easily track the location of the tag 
using its id he/she overheard, or the attacker can forge the presence of the tag by replaying the 
overheard response. To solve these problems, we demand a secure search protocol. By a secure 
search protocol between a reader and a tag, we mean that the following two properties should be 
satisfied. 
Property 1: Only the reader is aware of the identity of the target tag, but an eavesdropper 
cannot infer the tag’s identity from the communication between the reader and the tag. 
Property 2: The reader can determine the presence of the tag, but an adversary is not able 
to forge the tag’s presence if it is not present. However, the protocols ensures strong security if 
the attacker is not able to determine the presence of the tag. 
However satisfying the above two properties will make the search protocols secure but 
the protocols will not be efficient. If we use a naive search approach to find a tag, the 
computational complexity will increase linearly with the number of the tags and this technique 
will raise scalability issues. 
Suppose we have a large library where each book is equipped with a tag. A book can be 
easily misplaced by any chance (e.g., because of a visitor’s negligence or a librarian’s mistake). 
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Using a randomized authentication protocol to find a specific book is in efficient as the server 
needs to authenticate half of the books in the library on average. Therefore, designing an efficient, 
secure search protocol is essential in an RFID system. 
In an efficient search protocol, the server would expect to only receive a response from a 
designated tag. Otherwise, the server would need to handle responses from multiple tags. On the 
other hand, a tag should not respond before properly authenticating the server since a query may 
not be from an authentic server, but from an attacker who wants to track the tag. Therefore, the 
protocol should be a one-round protocol, and a tag should authenticate the server without giving 
any challenge. When designing a secure, anonymous, untraceable search protocol, we face 
scalability problems as it increases computational complexity in the reader/back-end server. In 
other words, there is a tradeoff between scalability and other security parameters. Search 
protocols for RFID systems should not only be designed to address security threats and scalability 
issues, but should also consider the little capacities of RFID tags. 
A wide variety of authentication protocols for RFID systems have been proposed. Each 
of the protocols has their own strengths and weakness. Many of these protocols have privacy, 
security, and/or performance drawbacks. However, tag searching is a relatively new issue and it 
has been mentioned in limited research literatures [Tan07, Ahamed08b, Kulseng09, and Lee10]. 
For these reasons, this thesis focuses on the design of RFID search protocols that ensure 
security and scalability. The thesis begins by identifying the security, scalability and performance 
requirements for such protocols. We aim to propose novel RFID search protocols that meet the 
identified requirements. We also aim to propose a new type of tag searching that we name as tag 
monitoring for the next generation tags such as WISP (Wireless Identification and Sensing 
Platform) tags.  
1.3. Major Contributions 
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In this thesis we consider RFID tag searching protocols that ensure security and 
scalability. The main contributions of the thesis are as follows: 
• We summarize all the possible attacks that can be launched against RFID systems. 
• We point out the security requirements that should be guaranteed by the RFID 
protocol designers to protect against the major security attacks.  
• We also point out the scalability and performance requirements for RFID protocols. 
• We introduce the notion of serverless (without a central server) RFID tag searching. 
From this perspective, we propose a lightweight, secure, and serverless search protocol (S3PR) for 
RFID systems. The unique feature of this protocol is that it can provide the same level of security 
and searching capacity as an RFID system with a back end server. Moreover, this protocol is not 
vulnerable to single point-of-failure as it does not rely on central server. 
• We address the tradeoff between security and scalability. From this perspective, we 
propose a secure and scalable RFID tag searching protocol (S-Search) for large scale RFID 
systems using Slotted ALOHA based technique. This protocol is also lightweight as makes use of 
simple hash function to provide security. The unique feature of this protocol is that it is highly 
scalable and therefore it is suitable to be used in large scale RFID networks, such as supply chain 
and inventory control. 
• We propose hexagonal cell based distributed scalable architecture (EDSA) for RFID 
tag searching in an emergency evacuation system. This standard architecture can be used in 
different RFID applications for scalable tag searching. We analyze and compare our architecture 
with a prior work. We also prove that our hexagonal cell structure increases the performance of 
the RFID systems and outperforms the prior work. 
• We introduce the concept of tag monitoring as a new dimension of tag searching. We 
propose a tag monitoring protocol (MonAC) for WISP based sensor networks. To the best of our 
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knowledge, this is the first proposal to address the tag monitoring approach for a network of Gen 
2 tags, i.e. WISP tags based networks. 
For the rest of the thesis, we consider typical RFID tags that are capable of generating 
Pseudo Random Number (PRNG), performing simple hash function and XOR operation. 
1.4. Thesis Organization 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 
• In chapter 2, we give a brief description of RFID technology. We compare RFID 
systems with the existing barcode technology. Then, we discuss some popular application areas 
of RFID technology. Next in this section, we discuss different components of RFID systems and 
their constraints. Then, we describe RFID standards and point out the differences between 
different types of EPC class tags. In this chapter, we also compare tags of Gen 1 and Gen 2. 
• In chapter 3, we start by pointing out the attack objectives and goals of the RFID 
system attacker. Then we briefly discuss the security requirements of RFID systems and RFID 
protocols. Next we define different types of adversary. This is followed by a detailed discussion 
of different types of attacks in RFID systems. Finally, we explain the attack intentions of an 
adversary who may have various purpose of attacking the system. 
• In chapter 4, we discuss related works relevant to RFID search techniques. Although 
tag search is a major issue for RFID systems, the assortment of research literature on RFID 
searching is inadequate. Since RFID tag searching is an extension of RFID authentication, we 
therefore discuss some famous RFID authentication techniques in this section. 
• In chapter 5, we address the problem of secure serverless tag searching. First, we 
describe the problems of central server based RFID networks and illustrate some situations where 
serverless RFID searching can be very important. Next, we describe some trivial approaches to 
solve the problem and point out their shortcomings. We then continue to present our protocol 
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(S3PR) for a serverless RFID system. Finally, we perform a security analysis of our proposed 
protocol. 
• In chapter 6, we address the problem of scalable tag searching. First, we describe the 
problem of un-scalable searching approaches for large scale RFID networks. Next, we present a 
secure and scalable search protocol (S-Search) using Slotted ALOHA technique. Finally, we 
evaluate our protocol by doing a security analysis. 
• In chapter 7, we address the problem of a lack of standard architecture to perform 
scalable tag searching in an RFID system. This is followed by a description of an existing 
architecture and its shortcomings. Then, we present an enhanced distributed scalable architecture 
(EDSA) with hexagonal cell. This is followed by the comparison between our proposal and the 
prior work. Finally, we explain the application of our architecture in an emergency evacuation 
system. 
• In chapter 8, we start by giving a brief introduction of a Gen 2 tag (Wireless 
Identification and Sensing Platform or WISP). Next, we discuss a potential application scenario 
of WISP. Then, we introduce a new notion of tag searching, tag monitoring, for WISP based 
networks. This is followed by a brief discussion of the security and scalability problems that may 
occur while WISP tag monitoring. We then propose a monitoring technique (MonAC) which does 
not require the reader to collect ids from each WISP tag. Finally, security proofs of our proposed 
protocol are presented. 
• In chapter 9, we make our conclusions and describe our future work in the area of 
securing WISP networks and simple RFID networks. 
• The appendix contains definitions of different terms mentioned within the thesis. 
1.5. Publications 
This thesis contains material that has been published in [Ahamed08a, Ahamed08b, 
Ahamed08d, Hoque09, and Hoque10]. The contents of [Ahamed08b] form the basis for chapter 
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5, the contents of [Hoque10] form the basis for chapter 6 and the contents of [Ahamed08a] forms 
the basis for chapter 7. The contents of [Ahamed08b] have been updated since publication, and an 
updated version can be found in [Ahamed08d and Hoque09]. 
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Chapter 2: Overview of RFID Technology 
The goal of this chapter is to discuss some basics of RFID technology. It starts by 
highlighting the current evolution of automatic identification from barcodes to RFID and 
compares the existing auto-id systems. Subsequently current RFID systems are classified and 
compared. After a system overview has been given, the technical background of RFID readers 
and tags are discussed. Finally, properties of various RFID standards are discussed at the end of 
this chapter. 
2.1. Historical Perspective of RFID 
RFID is the acronym of Radio Frequency IDentification. It designates a large family of 
technologies and devices all having in common the aim to identify objects or persons with RFID 
tags. Even if RFID is often thought of as a very new domain, actually it dates back to World War 
II. British technology IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) has been developed in the late 1930s to help 
the Royal Air Force to distinguish between friendly and hostile aircrafts and it is the ancestor of 
RFID technology. Basically, the IFF of WWII and Soviet era systems used coded radar signals 
(called Cross-Band Interrogation, or CBI) to automatically trigger the aircraft transponder in an 
aircraft “painted” by the radar. An aircraft responding to an IFF request was then considered a 
friend, one not responding a foe. This technique was intended to reduce friend-fire. Since then 
RFID has seen new forms and applications.  
Starting in the late 80’s battery powered active RFID devices have been used for 
automatic toll collecting on motorway (e.g. Telepass in Italy). Nevertheless the big revolution, 
bringing RFID to the attention of common people and media, has certainly been due to the 
progresses in miniaturization which leaded to very small and cheap tags which are well suited for 
being applied on single packages of products.  
2.2. From Barcodes to RFID 
12 
Barcodes are predominantly used for identifying and tracking products throughout the 
supply chain. Even though they can achieve efficiencies in the order of 90% [Fin03], they still 
show some limits in the technology, for which RFID is able to provide a better solution and 
further optimization. Bar coding is a cost-effective and low-risk method of encoding information. 
RFID on the other hand enables users to encode information for many items simultaneously with 
no line-of-sight requirement. Unlike bar codes, for which many standards already exist, RFID is 
just at the beginning of standardization. There are common frequency ranges for example, but the 
reader power output and specific frequency may vary by company and manufacturer. In addition, 
systems within the same frequency range may have their own chip set, protocol for memory 
storage, air protocol and antenna design. With no-contact, no-line-of-sight reading, the RFID 
tag’s position is not as crucial as it is for barcodes. Furthermore RFID tags are more robust than 
barcodes in foggy and dusty environments. With decreasing equipment and tag costs, RFID gains 
competitive edge over barcodes.  
RFID technology already has started to be applied in several practical situations where 
barcodes were used to be applied before. For instance, Wal-Mart has recently asked to all its 
suppliers to embed RFID tags into their products to allow per item tracing of goods, from the 
producer to the final consumer. Similar experiments have been conducted by Gilette and 
Benetton. Recently Hitachi has presented its µ-chip (see figure 2.1.2), just 4 mm2 big and 60 
microns thick. Currently the retail price for a passive RFID tag is about 0.10$ and a further 
reduction of the cost is anticipated for the next few years. Moreover, RFID passive tags are, in 
most of the cases, very simple devices with few or no intelligence on board. Nevertheless all the 
efforts of the producers are in the direction of reduction of cost more than in that of feature 
enhancing. For all these reasons, RFID technology is going to be in the next years a big player in 
logistic, health care, automation and many other areas. At the same time, the broad diffusion of 
RFID devices introduces a problem related to privacy of persons owning or carrying objects 
identifiable by means of tags. Solutions to these concerns are far from being trivial especially 
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because standard cryptographic tools used to enforce privacy cannot be employed in cheap and 
less powerful devices as the ones used for mass distribution.  
2.3. RFID Applications 
Next we discuss some popular application areas of RFID technology. 
2.3.1. EPC 
EPC stands for Electronic Product Code. It is proposed by EPC Global, a nonprofit 
organization made up of several companies and academics. It aims to standardize the use of RFID 
technology for inventory by establishing an Electronic Product Code (EPC) Network as a global 
standard for automatic and accurate identification of any item in the supply chain of any 
company, in any industry, and anywhere in the world. The EPC global Network was developed 
by the Auto-ID Center, an academic research project headquartered at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (M.I.T) with labs at five leading research universities around the globe. 
The Electronic Product Code (EPC) is indented to be the way of providing product 
identification. It was intended to standardize the way in which tag’s ids are structured and 
assigned. Similarly to a bar code its goal is to identify products but it differs from printed codes 
as these usually identify a broad category of products (e.g. 1 liter milk box) while EPC links to a 
specific item of a product (e.g. 1 liter milk box, produced on July 6th 2006, item n. 
21389432287). Like many current numbering schemes used in commerce, the EPC is divided into 
numbers that identify the manufacturer and product type, in addition to a supplementary set of 
digits which identifies each specific item. The EPC is the key to the information about the 
product it identifies that exists in the EPC global Network.  
2.3.2. Access Control 
One of the first applications of RFID technology has probably been to ski pass. Starting 
several years ago, skiers in many resorts have been provided with an RFID contactless card in 
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order to quickly gain access to ski lifts. Contactless cards are lately spreading fast in access 
control applications, classical contact chip-card being substituted by RFID contactless cards. 
Figure 2.1.7 shows the new Camipro card which in 2006 takes the place of the former contact 
chip-card, which has been in use in the past 15 years for authentication of students and personnel 
at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology of Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland. 
2.3.3. Anti-counterfeit 
Many products are subject to counterfeit and imitation. To reduce this phenomenon, 
many producers are starting to embed RFID tags in their merchandise (clothes, watches, spare 
parts, etc.). Stolen or counterfeit items can then be easily identified by RFID scanning. 
2.3.4. Implantable Devices 
Verichip, an American company manufacturing RFID tags, develops human implantable 
RFID tags. These special tags (see figure 2.1.3) are passive transponders (it would be extremely 
difficult to replace batteries once the tag has been implanted) and are injected under skin with a 
sort of special needle. The applications of these types of tags may go from access control to 
health care (patient identification, infant protection, etc.) 
2.3.5. Libraries 
RFID allows a fast and automatic tracing of items. This feature is particularly suited to 
applications as library automation. In libraries RFID are starting taking the place of barcodes. The 
barcodes need visual contact to be scanned and they are easily deteriorated by use. In addition 
they cannot perform multiple scan at the same time. On the other hand, RFID technology (see 
figure 2.1.1 and figure 2.1.4) allows autonomous checkouts where the patron just passing under 
library’s batters is identified (via a contactless card) and so are the books that are identified. The 
system automatically checks if the patron can borrow the books and updates library’s data base 
setting a “lent” flag. 
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Figure 2.1.1 Misc smart labels inlay tags 
 
Figure 2.1.2 Hitachi produces the smallest 
RFID tag (just 0.33mm2) 
 
Figure 2.1.3 Human implantable tag by Verichip 
 
Figure 2.1.4 A square label tag 
 
Figure 2.1.5 Baggage tracking with RFID labels 
 
Figure 2.1.6 The new Ford keys containing 
RFID device to check the authenticity of the 
key 
 
Figure 2.1.7 Camipro contactless card are the 
new cards in use at EPFL for access control 
 
Figure 2.1.8 RFID used in Supply Chain 
Source: [Bocchetti08] 
Figure 2.1 Different types of RFID devices used in different RFID systems or applications  
2.3.6. Supply Chain 
The supply chain is a multi-stage process, which involves everything from the supplying 
of prime materials, used to develop products, to the products delivery to customers via 
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warehouses and distribution centers. Supply chains exist in service, manufacturing and retail 
organizations. Although, the complexity of the chain changes greatly from one industry branch to 
another, its management can be seen as the organization of the flows of these materials, as they 
move through the various processes. The efficiency of the supply chain has a direct impact on the 
profitability of a company. Therefore any major company striving for competitive edge needs to 
invest in infrastructures to control inventory, track products and manage associated finance.  
By increasing transparency in the supply chain, RFID allows the optimization of logistic 
processes. The primary goal is the discovery of inefficiencies in the value chain within and 
between the companies thus rationalizing the material, information and financial flows. RFID 
(see figure 2.1.8) enables the fine grained tracking of the entire objects within the network, thus 
facilitating the detection and the locating of losses and shrinkage, the result of misplaced orders, 
theft and inefficient stock management.  
2.3.7. Car Ignition Control 
An RFID tag is embedded in the ignition key (see figure 2.1.6). When starting the car the 
tag in the key is used to assure of the key’s genuineness. If the authentication fails the car does 
not start. Companies employing this technology declare that so far not even one case has been 
reported in which this system has been defeated. All stolen cars which employ this technology 
have been taken towing the car with a trailer. 
2.4. RFID Systems 
RFID systems are made up of three main components: RFID tag, RFID reader, and the 
back-end database. Figure 2.2 illustrates an example of a typical RFID system. In the following 
subsections, we explain the details of different components of an RFID system. 
2.4.1. RFID tags or transponder
In an RFID system, each object will be labeled
with some computation and storage capabilities, and
be classified according to three
A) Memory Type: The memory element serves as writable
Tags can be programmed to be
on the kind of tag, tag programming can take place at the
application level. 
B) Power Source: A tag can obtain power from the signal
can have its own internal source
category of the tag. 
• Passive RFID tags.
harvest their power from the reader that
Figure 2.2 A simple RFID system 
 
 with a tag. Each tag contains a microchip 
 an antenna coil for communication. Tags can 
 main criteria (see figure 2.3): 
Figure 2.3 Types of RFID Tags 
 and non-writable data storage. 
 read-only, write-once read-many, or fully rewritable
 manufacturing level or at the 
 received from the reader, or it 
 of power. The way the tag gets its power generally defines the
 Passive tags do not have an internal source of power. They 
 sends out electromagnetic waves. They are restricted in
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their read/write range as they rely on RF energy from the reader for both power and 
communication. 
• Semi-passive RFID tags. Semi-passive tags use a battery to run the microchip’s 
circuitry but communicate by harvesting power from the reader signal. 
• Active RFID tags. Active tags possess a power source that is used to run the 
microchip’s circuitry and to broadcast a signal to the reader.  
C) Computational capability: Based on the computational capacity of RFID tags, there 
are mainly two types [Song09] of them: dumb and smart.  
• Dumb tags: A dumb tag has very low computation capacity and it has a unique 
identifier that is of a fixed unique length (usually 10 or 16 hexadecimal digits long) value. The 
memory capacity of a dumb tag is likely to be fairly small (i.e. hundred bytes to 2kBytes).  
• Smart tags: Smart tags have a small processor built within it that has the capability 
do some cryptographic operation [Laurie07]. They usually have a larger memory capacity 
(32kBytes or more) compared to the dumb tags. Smart tags can perform authentication before 
allowing access to the stored data. Such a tag can encrypt communications to avoid some major 
attacks [Laurie07]. 
2.4.2. Constraints on the Tag 
1) Tag is passive: It has no batteries. It can operate just when interrogated by a reader and 
only for a short time after each interrogation. 
2) Tag has limited memory: Each tag has on board only a few kilobits of memory to 
store its id and its secrets. At present the majority of the tags can just save a fixed 96 bit id. 
Nevertheless we consider more sophisticated tags where some more memory is available 
otherwise there would be no space for any cryptographic data.  
3) Tag has limited computational abilities: Each tag can perform only basic calculations, 
hash calculations, PRNG, AES 2. Public-key cryptography is quite expensive. 
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4) Tag provides no physical security: Each tag can be physically opened, thus revealing 
the complete contents of its memory. 
5) Tag communicates at up to a fixed distance: The tag-to-reader communication is 
limited to a few meters but the reader-to-tag communication could be eavesdropped at a greater 
distance. 
All these choices of tags are arbitrary and one could find tags with different 
Characteristics (e.g. more expensive). Nevertheless our choice is at present quite realistic.  
2.4.3. RFID Readers or Transceiver 
 
Source: http://www.thebarcodewarehouse.co.uk/Assets/Images/Products/16006.jpg 
Figure 2.4 A simple RFID reader 
RFID readers are generally composed of an RF module, a control unit, and an antenna 
element to interrogate electronic tags via RF communication. Readers may have better internal 
storage and processing capabilities, and frequently connection to backend databases. Complex 
computations, such as all kind of cryptographic operations, may be carried out by RFID readers, 
as they do not have more limitations than those found in modern handheld devices or PDAs. 
Figure 2.4 shows an RFID reader. 
2.4.4. Constraints on the Reader 
While having constraints on the tag seems quite obvious, one could think that no real 
concern should arise about characteristics of the readers. We should therefore explain where the 
concerns about the complexity of reader-side algorithms arise from. 
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Many RFID systems are composed by millions of tags. Think, as an example, about a big 
library where an RFID tag could be attached to each book. While checking out from the library 
the system has to recognize, before a patron crosses the door, which book he brings with him, 
determine if he can borrow it and update its record on a database, stating the “borrowed” status of 
the book. Of course all these operations have to be accomplished in a matter of fractions of a 
second. Having a high search complexity could lead to an unrealistic scenario where the user has 
to wait 30 seconds next to the reader at the library exit while the system performs its calculations. 
Some applications are even more time-critical. Therefore, efficient and scalable search protocols 
need to be installed in the reader. However, the main concern on the reader is the number of 
cryptographic operations to perform to identify tags.  
2.4.5. Back-end server 
The information provided by tags is usually an index to a back-end server (pointers, 
randomized ids, etc.). This limits the information stored in tags to only a few bits, which is a 
sensible choice due to severe tag limitations in processing and storing. It is generally assumed 
that the connection between readers and back-end databases is secure, because processing and 
storing constraints are not so tight in readers. 
2.4.6. Constraints on the RFID  System 
The constraints on the two main ingredients of an RFID system (tags and readers) have 
already been highlighted, but still some limits on the characteristics of the whole system should 
be delineated. 
1) Connection: Unless otherwise specified, transceivers and the back-end server are 
interconnected by means of a secure channel with constant infinite available bandwidth. 
2) Scalability: More tags could be added to the system at any time. 
2.4.7. Cryptography for RFID Systems 
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We make the following assumptions about the availability of cryptographic functions in 
simple RFID tags. 
• There are sufficiently secure hash functions which are suitable for a low-cost tag. 
• There is a sufficiently secure pseudo-random number generator for a low-cost tag. 
2.5. RFID Standards 
In any technology, lack of standards leads to inefficiencies because customers have to 
rely on a single equipment provider. Even the well known EPC standard is not yet fully 
standardized in its details. Another problem is that frequency regulations are not internationally 
standardized. EPC Global standardizes different categories of devices, in relation with the 
technical characteristics and the functionalities provided by the tag. Each class includes all the 
properties of the previous and adds some new. The summary of EPC class is showed in table 2.1. 
Class 0: Class 0 tags are the simplest type of tags, where the data, which are usually a 
simple id number (EPC), are written into the tag only once during manufacture. No further 
updates are possible. These tags announce their presence when passing through an antenna field. 
Table 2.1 EPC class types 
Class type Specification 
Class 0 Read only tags 
Class 1 Write once, read many tags 
Class 1 Gen 2 Write once, read many tags, UHF Gen 2 protocol 
Class 2 Rewritable tags 
Class 3 Semi-passive tags 
Class 4 Active tags 
Class 1: Class 1 tags are manufactured with no data written into the memory. Data can 
either be written by the tag manufacturer or by the user, but only once. After this no further 
update is possible and the tag can only be read.  
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Class 2: Class 2 tags allow users to both, read and write data into the tag’s memory. They 
are typically used as data loggers, and therefore contain more memory space than tags which 
carry only simple ID numbers. 
Class 3: Class 3 tags are just like class 2 tags except that they contain on-board sensors 
for recording parameters like temperature and pressure, which are recorded into the tags memory. 
As sensor readings must be loaded into memory in absence of the reader, the tags are either semi-
passive or active, thus requiring an on-board power source. 
Class 4: Class 4 tags are equipped with integrated transmitters. These tags are similar to 
radio devices, which can communicate with other tags and devices in the absence of a reader. 
Presently deployed Gen 1 UHF RFID systems are based on a number of competing 
protocols, most notably Matric’s Class 0 and Alien Technology’s Class 1. There is a problem that 
these protocols are proprietary. Beyond that, they lack the features, reliability and power to 
adequately serve a growing number of applications, particularly when taking worldwide 
operability into account. MIT’s Auto-ID Center recognized these problems and created a single 
open standard that would firstly create an environment of interoperability and international 
regulatory compliance and secondly would raise the bar on RFID system performance in a 
significant way. These two values formed the backbone of the EPC Gen 2 UHF standard. With a 
single worldwide specification in place, UHF RFID-based systems are expected to become faster, 
easier to use, less costly to deploy and more robust. 
2.6. Generation 2 vs Generation 1 
The EPC global Class-1 Gen-2 RFID specification [Claas-1] was adopted by EPC global 
in 2004 and was sent to ISO. These specifications provide a great advance to consolidate the 
adoption of RFID technology. Where previously there were several specifications such as EPC 
Class-1 and EPC Class-0, a single UHF specification is now established. In order to ease a 
worldwide deployment, emerging UHF regulations in different regions have been taken into 
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account. Additionally, the best features of the preceding specifications have been improved, and a 
range of future applications including higher-function sensor tags have been foreseen. 
2.7. Integration Costs 
Currently the prices of tags are still too high for many companies to make RFID an 
investment. However business analysts project that the tag costs will be falling rapidly with 
increasing mass production. Moreover, significant investments in the infrastructure have to be 
made for the flourish deployment of RFID system. This includes equipment, such as terminals 
and networks for the collection, processing, and evaluation of the data supplied by the RFID 
system. Additionally the restructuring of business process and parallel operation during the initial 
phase are also major cost factors. 
2.8. Summary 
RFID makes use of radio transmission to recognize, categorize, locate and track objects. 
In this chapter, we discuss the components of RFID systems that are:  readers, tags and a back-
end database for storage and management of the collected data. The tags are attached to the 
products and can be read when they enter a reader’s antenna field. We also discuss properties and 
capabilities of different categories of RFID tags. This is followed by the discussion of constraints 
of RFID tags, readers, back-end server, and the system. We also discuss RFID standards and the 
details of different types of EPC classes. 
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Chapter 3: Attacking RFID Systems 
RFID technology is a pervasive technology, perhaps one of the most pervasive in history. 
However security and privacy concerns are the major drawback of this technology. One should be 
aware that the ways of collecting, storing and analyzing vast amounts of information about 
consumers existed even before the appearance of RFID technology. For example, we usually pay 
with credit cards, give our names and address for merchandizing, use cookies while surfing the 
Internet, etc.  
For RFID systems a great variety of attacks can be identified. Attacks against the RFID 
systems opened the door for the development of both classical and modern security techniques, 
ranging from signal jamming to challenge-response identification. And it is just as likely that 
RFID will continue to inspire progress in security and privacy research in the future, as it has 
done for decades. 
 The major goal of this chapter is to give an overview of the primary security 
requirements of RFID systems and the traditional mechanisms to fulfill those requirements. 
Another objective is to categorize the existing weaknesses of RFID systems so that a better 
understanding of RFID attacks can be achieved. 
3.1. Attack Objectives 
In an RFID system the objectives of each attack can be very different. It is important to 
identify the potential targets in order to understand all the possible attacks. The target can be the 
complete system (i.e. disrupt the whole of a business system) or only a section of the entire 
system (i.e. a particular item). A great number of information systems focus solely on protecting 
the transmitted data. However, when designing RFID systems, additional objectives, such as 
tracking or data manipulation should be considered. Let us imagine the following example in a 
store: an attacker modifies the tag content of an item reducing its price from 100 to 9.90 ¤. This 
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leads to a huge loss for the store. In this scenario, the data may be transmitted in a secure form 
and the database has not been manipulated. However, attack is carried out because part of the 
system has been modified. Therefore, in order to make a system secure, all of its components 
should be considered. Neglecting one component, whatever the security level of the remaining 
components, could compromise the security of the whole system. As shown in the above 
example, the attack may be perpetrated to steal or reduce the price of a single item, while other 
attacks could aim to prevent all sales at a store. An attacker may introduce corrupt information in 
the database to render it inoperative. Some attacks, such as the active jamming attack, are 
inherent in the wireless technology employed. Other attacks focus on eliminating physical access 
control, and ignore the data. Some involve identity stealing from legitimate e-passports, and etc. 
3.2. Security Requirements 
RFID technology may bring spontaneous risks because of the proliferation of RFID tags. 
Certain security requirements must be addressed by every RFID protocol to maintain the security 
and privacy of the overall RFID system. Number of research literatures [Ahamed08c, Avoine05, 
Bringer06, Cai09, Chien07, Choi04, Conti07, Cui07, Gilbert05, Henrici04, Hoque09, Hopper00, 
Hopper01, Juels05a, Juels05b, Juels05c, Juels06, Lee10, Molnar04, and Ohkubo03] deals with 
several privacy and security issues of RFID. Therefore, we try to point out the security goals that 
should be guaranteed by a protocol: 
• Privacy protection: A tag cannot be distinguished by an adversary without tampering it 
and realizing the data stored in the tag. 
• Anti-tracking: It is tough for an adversary to track a tag if the adversary does not have 
any information about the tag. But the attacker can track a tag, if the tag replies with a constant 
response each time it is queried. So protocols should be designed such that a tag neither reveals 
its  nor replies with constant response. 
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• Anti-cloning: In order to clone a tag, an adversary needs to know the secret key shared 
between a tag and the authorized reader. So, to be secured against cloning attack, protocols 
should never reveal the shared secret key. 
• Synchronization: Attacker should not able to update the key used by the tag or the 
reader to secure the communication.  
• DoS resiliency: Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack means an authorized entity is prevented 
from accessing its authorized entities. In order to ensure successful communication between a 
reader and its authorized tags, it should be guaranteed that an adversary cannot desynchronize 
them. 
• Not susceptible to replay attack: Security must be ensured against replay attacks so 
that an adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate tag by replaying an eavesdropped message. 
• Forward secrecy: An adversary compromising a tag will not be able to identify the 
previous outputs of the tag. 
• Backward secrecy: An adversary compromising a tag will be unable to track future 
transactions even if it has access to the tag’s present internal state. 
3.3. Adversary Types 
The adversary can be categorized into the following classes: 
• Weak adversary: This type of adversary cannot corrupt any tags. 
• Strong adversary: This type of adversary has no limitations on corrupting tags, and 
can do anything at its wish. For each category of adversary defined above, it is also defined a 
narrow variant, where a narrow adversary cannot access the outputs of the players (i.e., reader 
and tags) for any protocol run. 
• Forward adversary: This type of adversary can corrupt tags under the limitation that 
once the adversary corrupts a tag, it can do nothing subsequently except for corrupting more tags. 
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• Destructive adversary: This type of adversary can do anything after a tag corruption, 
but under the limitation that the adversary cannot reuse a tag after corrupting it. Specifically, once 
a tag is corrupted it will be virtually destroyed. In particular, a destructive adversary cannot 
observe or interact with a corrupted tag nor can the adversary impersonate a corrupted tag to the 
reader. 
3.4. Classification of Different Attacks 
This upcoming section discusses the major classes of attacks that are usually launched 
against RFID systems.  
3.4.1. Modification of data 
This type of attack deals with the alteration of data saved within the memory of the tags. 
By unauthorized write access, the data stored on the tag can be modified. This attack is only 
effective if the identifier and security information such as keys remain unchanged. Otherwise this 
attack leads to denial-of-service. The attack is only possible if additional data along with the 
identifier are stored. 
3.4.2. Deactivation of tags 
In this type of attack, the tag is made inoperative by executing a dedicated command or 
by physical intervention. Depending on the degree of deactivation the identity or the presence of 
the tag can no longer be determined. 
3.4.3. Active jamming 
Although passive interference is usually unintentional, an attacker can take advantage of 
the fact that an RFID tag listens indiscriminately to all radio signals in its range. Thus, an 
adversary may cause electromagnetic jamming by creating a signal in the same range as the 
reader in order to prevent tags from communicating with readers. 
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3.4.4. Sniffing or tracking 
RFID tags are designed to be readable by any compliant reader. Unfortunately, this 
allows unauthorized readers to scan tagged items, oftentimes from great distances. This type is 
attack is called sniffing or tracking and this is one of the major attacks launched in most of the 
RFID systems. This type of attack can also be launched by eavesdropping on the wireless channel 
between the tag and the reader. Tracking of RFID tags allows monitoring of individuals' 
whereabouts and actions. RFID readers placed in strategic locations (like doorways) can record 
RFID tags' unique responses, which can then be persistently associated with a person's identity. 
RFID tags without unique identifiers can also facilitate tracking by forming collections which are 
recurring groups of tags that are associated with an individual. In such cases, RFID technology 
also enables the monitoring of entire groups of people. Moreover, tracking attack will also lead to 
unrestricted access to tag data or tagged object’s information. Unrestricted access to tag data can 
have serious implications and collected tag data might reveal information like medical 
predispositions or unusual personal inclinations, which could cause denial of insurance coverage 
or employment for an individual.  
3.4.5. Spoofing or cloning 
In this type of attack, the attackers can create authentic RFID tags, by writing 
appropriately formatted data on blank RFID tags. For example, thieves could retag items in a 
supermarket identifying them as similar, but cheaper, products. Tag cloning is another kind of 
spoofing attack, which produces unauthorized copies of legitimate RFID tags.  
3.4.6. Replay attack 
Replay devices are capable of intercepting and retransmitting RFID queries, which could 
be used to abuse a variety of RFID applications. These types of attacks usually occur in situations 
where RFID components use a challenge response based protocol. RFID tags and readers usually 
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share a secret and use a challenge response protocol to authenticate their identities. Nevertheless, 
very often this approach is subject to replay attacks. In a replay attack, an adversary broadcasts a 
tag’s response recorded from a past transaction in order to impersonate the tag to a reader. 
Typical example of this attack is the unauthorized access to restricted areas by broadcasting an 
exact replay of the radio signal sent from a legitimate tag to the reader that grants access. 
3.4.7. Relay attack 
In a relay attack an adversary acts as a man-in-the-middle. An adversarial device is 
placed surreptitiously between a legitimate RFID tag and reader. This device is able to intercept 
and modify the radio signal between the legitimate tag and reader. Subsequently, a momentary 
connection is relayed from the legitimate tag/reader through the adversarial device to the 
legitimate reader/tag. The legitimate tag and reader are fooled into thinking that they are 
communicating directly with each other. To make this type of attack even more sophisticated, 
separate devices could be used, one for the communication with the reader and one for the 
communication with the RFID tag.  
A number of factors combine to make relay attacks on RFID technology. Tags are read 
over a distance and activated automatically when close to a reader. This allows an attacker to 
communicate with a tag without the knowledge of its owner. Two devices, as shown in figure 3.1, 
are involved in the relay attack: the ghost and the leech [Czeskis08]. The ghost is a device which 
fakes a card to the reader, and the leech is a device which fakes a reader to the card. A fast 
communication channel between the legitimate reader and the victim card is created by the ghost 
and the leech: 
1. The legitimate reader sends a message to the ghost 
2. The ghost receives it and forwards this message to the leech through the fast 
communication channel 
3. The leech fakes the real reader, and sends the message to the legitimate tag 
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4. The legitimate tag computes a new message and transmits it to the leech 
5. The leech receives it and forwards this message to the ghost through the fast 
communication channel 
6. The ghost forwards this message to the real reader 
This sort of attack dispels the assumption that readers and tags should be very close to 
communicate. Additionally, even if communications were encrypted, the attack is feasible 
because messages are only relayed through a fast communication channel, without requiring 
knowledge of their contents. 
 
Figure 3.1 Example of relay attack (ghost and leech attack) 
3.4.8. Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
This is a type of attack in which an attacker causes RFID tags to reach to such a state 
from which they can no longer function properly. This results in the tags becoming either 
temporarily or permanently out of operation. More precisely, in this attack a tag is attacked with 
queries from an illegitimate reader. As a result, that tag is not able to respond to a further query 
from the legitimate reader. In other words, a genuine reader cannot communicate with its 
legitimate tags. A similar attack is also possible on the reader, but since the tag is much more 
resource constrained than the reader, they are more susceptible to such attacks than the readers. 
Such attacks are often intensified by the mobile nature of the tags, allowing them to be 
manipulated at a distance by covert readers. This type of attack can be a serious threat to the 
integrity of automated inventory and shipping applications. 
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3.4.9. Server impersonation attacks 
Server impersonation means that an adversary is able to impersonate a valid server to a 
tag. One reason that this is a genuine threat is because de-synchronization can occur if a tag 
updates its stored data when the server does not. More specifically, an attacker that compromises 
a tag’s stored secrets can impersonate an authorized server to the tag. If the attacker executes an 
authentication session with the tag, impersonating a valid server, then it can make the tag to 
update its stored secrets, although the genuine server does not update the secret corresponding to 
the tag entry. Then the tag and the real server can be desynchronized.  
3.4.10. Eavesdropping attack 
As RFID technology operates through radio channel, so communication can be covertly 
overheard. In eavesdropping an unauthorized individual uses an antenna in order to record 
communications between legitimate RFID tags and readers. In this type of attack, the 
communication between tag and reader over the air interface is intercepted, decoded and 
interpreted. A passive adversary can eavesdrop on messages between a reader and a tag and can 
keep records of the messages. The information recorded can be used to perform more 
sophisticated attacks later. The feasibility of this attack depends on many factors, such as the 
distance of the attacker from the legitimate RFID devices. 
There are two possible distances at which an attacker can listen to the messages 
exchanged between a tag and a reader. They are:  
Forward Channel Eavesdropping Range: In the reader-to-tag channel (forward 
channel) the reader broadcasts a strong signal, allowing its monitoring from a long distance. 
Backward Channel Eavesdropping Range: The signal transmitted in the tag-to-reader 
(backward channel) is relatively weak, and may only be monitored in close proximity to the tag. 
3.5. Attack Intentions 
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Table 3.1 Intentions behind attacks in RFID systems 
 Privacy 
Protection 
Access of 
data 
Denial of service Spoofing 
Modification of data     
Tag Spoofing     
Deactivation of tags     
Removal of tags     
Eavesdropping     
Jamming     
Reader Spoofing     
Table 3.1 various intentions that an adversary might have while attacking an RFID 
system. An attacker may want to access sensitive information or exploit an RFID system by 
spoofing an RFID tag. An attacker’s intention might be to make an RFID system unavailable 
(DoS attack). Even a user might launch an attack because he feels his right for privacy is violated. 
3.6. Summary 
Although RFID networks have many advantages, they also present a number of inherent 
vulnerabilities with serious potential security implications. In this chapter, we analyzed the 
security issues that arise with RFID. Firstly a discussion of the attack objectives of an adversary 
in an RFID system is given. Then the security requirements of RFID systems are pointed out. 
After that, some major possible attacks are identified and discussed. Finally, attack intentions of 
an RFID system attacker are identified.  
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Chapter 4: Related Work 
There are several attacks in RFID systems that are obstacles to make RFID more popular, 
and widespread then before. However, researchers have been working for long time to prevent 
those attacks in RFID systems and to facilitate the expansion of RFID technology. One key 
research area that focuses on securing RFID systems against major attacks is to design secure 
authentication methodologies. These authentication techniques are designed to execute while a 
reader communicates with an RFID tag for identification purpose. 
One extension of RFID tag authentication is known as tag searching. Tag searching 
means searching for an RFID tag from a large collection of tags. Any RFID authentication 
protocol which provides security and privacy can be used for this purpose. However, as the 
number of RFID tags increases, the cost of collecting data can be very high. More efficient 
methods for performing RFID tag search are needed. Search is a basic and invaluable tool for 
sifting through large amounts of data. Consider for example, a large pharmacy stocked with RFID 
embedded medication. A pharmacist wanting to find a particular drug can broadcast his query and 
receive an answer. Due to the limited broadcast range of RFID readers, the pharmacist can even 
determine the approximate locality of the medication by directing the RFID reader at different 
locations, i.e., towards different shelves. 
Though RFID tag searching is an important issue for most RFID systems, the assortment 
of research literature on RFID searching is inadequate. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to 
discuss some famous authentication techniques along with the proposed search protocols so far. 
4.1. Authentication Related Prior Works 
In this section we present some classic identification/authentication protocols for RFID. 
RFID security based research area can be divided into two categories. The first category 
is protocol based. This category mainly focuses on implementing protocols using secure, 
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lightweight primitives on small RFID tags in order to ensure security and privacy. The second 
category is hardware based and this category focuses on improving RFID tag hardware so that it 
can provide additional security primitives. All of our proposed protocols in this thesis fall in the 
first category. So we will not discuss about the hardware based category. However, interested 
readers can refer to [Juels05b] and [Rieback07] for more details. In this section, we will mainly 
discuss the research background related to the protocols based category. Within the area of the 
protocol based category numbers of techniques have been proposed for ensuring RFID security 
and the assortment of authentication protocols is quite extensive. Thus we shall avoid a broad 
review and focus on those works that are related to our contribution. Interested readers may refer 
to [Juels05b] and [Juels06]. 
• The Weis-Sarma-Rivest-Engels Protocol: Weis et al. [Weis03] proposed 
authentication protocol which used back-end database to perform the authentication. In this 
protocol, an RFID tag replies with a  when it is queried by a reader. The reader forwards 
this  to the back-end database which finds out the real ID of the tag for the reader. An 
RFID tag replies with the same  each time it is queried by a reader. So this protocol is not 
secured against tracking attack which hampers privacy of the tag holder. So the authors proposed 
a randomized hash lock scheme to solve this problem. In this scheme, a tag replies with 	
,
 ⊕  
, when it is queried by a reader. Here,  is the tag’s secret,  is a pseudorandom 
function and 
 is a random number generated by the tag. The reader forwards this reply to the 
secure database which then searches for the ID/tag secret key pair that matches with the reply. 
Under this scheme, an RFID tag replies with a different value each time it is queried by a reader 
as each reply of the tag involves a random number. 
• The Tsudik Protocol: Tsudik proposed a protocol, YA-TRAP, in [Tsudik06] that 
ensures high efficiency at the server side. It is a famous authentication protocol that places little 
burden on the back-end server. The principle advantage of this protocol is that the central 
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database avoids any real time processing. Authors proposed that YA-TRAP is really 
advantageous in situations where tag information is processed in batches rather than in real time. 
The fundamental idea of this protocol is based on monotonically increasing timestamp which 
makes this protocol secured against tracking.  But the use of the timestamp makes this protocol 
unsecured against DOS attack. In this protocol, an RFID tag update its timestamp based on a 
value provided by the reader. At the same time each tag stores  , where   is the 
maximum value that can be reached by the timestamp. When the timestamp reaches    a tag 
does not answer to the reader’s queries. Hence an adversary can send the tag a large enough 
timestamp so that it goes beyond . Thus it becomes quite easy for a malicious reader to 
create DOS attack. Although the solution to DOS was proposed in YA-TRAP+ [Avoine05], this 
protocol still lacks forward secrecy. 
• The Ohkubo-Suzki-Kinoshita Protocol: Another lightweight protocol is OSK 
[Ohkubo03]. Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita proposed that two hash function  and  are 
sufficient to provide indistinguishability and forward secrecy. Here,  is a one way hash function 
and  has random oracle. According to this protocol, a tag is initialized with a shared secret  
and the back-end server maintains a list of tags (, ). The tag updates its secret key after each 
query according to the following formula  = . And in response to the query from a 
reader, the tag replies  = . The server on the other hand uses  to identify the tag by 
performing a brute force search through the list of tags. OSK does not ensure scalability. In 
[Avoine05], Avoine and Oechslin modified OSK which removed the scalability problem. They 
introduced a time-memory tradeoff which reduced the computational complexity for inverting the 
hash function. Another problem of OSK is that a malicious reader may easily desynchronize a tag 
which eventually results in DOS attack. 
• The Henrici-M uller Protocol: In [Henrici04], Henrici and MÄuller relies one-way 
hash function to thwart tag tracking attacks. In this solution, a tag responses a reader's query with 
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two hash values and updates its stored values after a successful authentication. This solution does 
not provide full-degree of anti-tracking since a tag always replies with the same response before it 
is successfully authenticated. In addition, it does not provide forward security as a strong 
adversary could derive tag identifiers in previous sessions from the tag's current identifier and the 
server's random number. 
• The Molnar-Wagner Protocol: Molnar and Wagner [Molnar04] pointed out that the 
randomized hash lock scheme does not defend against an eavesdropper. An adversary can 
eavesdrop on the communication between reader and tag to learn the tag replies. The adversary 
then uses this information to impersonate the RFID tag to fool a reader. In this protocol, both the 
reader and tag share a secret (!). Both reader and tag generate random nonces 
, 
" and share 
them. By refreshing the random nonces during every instantiation of the protocol, replay attacks 
through eavesdropping are avoided. 
• The Hopper-Blum Protocols: Hopper and Blum propose a secure human 
authentication protocol in [Hopper00 and Hopper01]. Here, 
#·  ! and 
# ⊕ ! represent scalar 
product and exclusive-or (XOR) of k-bit binary vectors 
# and ! respectively. The HB protocol 
relies on the computational hardness of Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. It is meant 
only to be secure against passive attacks, and it is not secure against active attacks. A simple 
active attack, where an adversary pretending to be the reader, transmits a fixed 
# to the tag 
several times can retrieve the value of !. While humans may get suspicious with repeated, failed 
login attempts if they are actively queried by a computer, a simple tag will blindly reply to active 
queries. In other words, HB would not protect against skimming attacks.  
• The HB+ Protocol: An alternative method for RFID authentication is based on a 
“challenge and response” between a reader and a tag. Juels et. al. [Juels05a] observed that human 
authentication protocols can be applied to RFID, since RFID tags, like humans, have weak 
computational capabilities. They introduced HB protocol, in which a reader issues a new 
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challenge to a tag each time it queries an RFID tag. The tag computes the binary inner product 
based on the reader’s challenge, and returns the answer to the reader. The reader authenticates the 
tag by verifying the tag response. The HB+ protocol is an improvement over the HB protocol by 
using an additional binding factor from the tag to defend against an active adversary. Later work 
by [Piramuthu06], [Gilbert05], [Bringer06] improves on this idea. 
• The Seo-Kim Protocol: Seo et al. [Seo06] proposed a hash function based 
authentication protocol that ensures high scalability. This protocol is also untraceable. Here back-
end server ℬ has the following four fields associated with each tag: EPC, ℎ,  and the 
access PIN. Each tag saves the last timestamp & send by an authorized ℛ as &()*. Based on its 
own timestamp & and shared secret key , reader compute ℎ, & and transmits it to the 
tag  +  together witℎ &. Tag recognizes an authorized reader if & received from the reader is 
greater than &()* and replies with ℎ. Reader ℛ forwards ℎ and & to ℬ and here the 
back-end server comes into play. It updates the  of corresponding tag and asks the reader to 
pass on the message to the tag for synchronization. Upon reception of the message, tag + updates 
its  and &()*. The most significant contribution of this paper is scalability and forward 
secrecy. Updating  with a one way hash function ensures forward secrecy. Scalability is 
ensured in a sense that back-end server needs time complexity ,- to find a tag in multi tag 
environment where - is the number of tags that have same key  within the operating range of a 
reader. The drawback of this protocol is that ownership transfer requires external intervention.  
• The Seo-Lee-Kim Protocol: Seo et al. proposed another authentication protocol 
[Seo06b] that ensures high scalability and ownership transfer. It is a lightweight authentication 
protocol that employs a proxy in addition to the back-end server. The protocol is based on 
Universal Re-encryption which allows the back-end server to get the tag identifier only after a 
simple decryption. This decryption requires a constant time which makes it one of the highest 
scalable authentication protocol. But its application area is restricted because of the use of proxy. 
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This protocol is best suited for personal use. But it suffers from the problem of traceability and 
some other security issues such as DOS attack and swapping. 
• The Tan-Sheng-Lee Protocol: In [Tan07], Chiu et al. proposed a serverless 
authentication protocol. In this protocol reader maintains an access list . which is used for tag 
authentication purpose. And each tag has a secret  which is not shared with anyone. Reader and 
tag both know 
, , where 
 is reader identifier. Here in response to the query from a reader, 
tag replies with some of the bits of ℎ
,  ∥  0  ∥  01 where 0 and 01 are two random 
numbers generated by the reader and the tag respectively and ℎ.  is a one way hash function. 
Since only a legitimate tag can generate ℎ
,  ∥  0  ∥  01, it works as tag’s certificate to the 
reader. At the same time tag queries reader with a question string. Only a legitimate reader replies 
with valid answer string which introduces the reader as an authorized reader to the tag. Tag 
releases its data only after realizing that the reader is legitimate. But here again the reader has to 
do a lot of computation to find out   of the required tag. But their protocol 2 is not purely and 
strongly anonymous as they return tag  by performing XOR operation with hash value for 
authentication. Moreover, they didn’t propose any technique for ownership transfer.  
• The Chien-Chen Protocol: In [Chien07], Chien and Chen used a challenge-response 
protocol to prevent replay attacks. To prevent denial of service attacks, both new key and old key 
for authenticating a tag are stored in back-end database. However, a strong adversary can still 
identify a tag's fixed EPC code, thus identify the tag's past and future interactions after 
compromising a tag. 
4.2. Search Related Prior Works 
Tag searching is different than tag authentication. Though a single tag can be searched 
using a secure authentication protocol, it will decrease the performance and response time of the 
overall RFID system. There have not been many attempts to produce a secure search protocol for 
RFID systems. RFID search protocols have not gathered much attention so far but research 
39 
literature in this area is also in an emerging state. In this section, we will explain different search 
protocols that are proposed in research literatures till now. 
• Hash based Serverless Search Protocols: Serverless RFID searching protocols were 
also proposed in [Tan07] for the first time. The authors produced a series of search solutions that 
require very little storage, and can be distributed without an explicit need for a back-end server. 
Their solutions base themselves on the RFID tag’s ability to perform hash computations. 
According to this protocol, a reader wishes to find out whether a specific tag is within its vicinity 
by broadcasting ℎ
, 1||04  ⊕ 1 , 04 and 
 . Based on this search query, only the intended 
tag, if exists, reply with its encrypted . Other tags within the reader’s vicinity reply a random 
number based on certain probability. Tags authenticate the reader based on the search query and 
reader authenticates tags based on the reply “string”. Both valid query and valid replies are 
generated by legitimate parties. In their protocol they used to use noise to mask the tag replies. 
Each tag receiving a search query that does not match the request replies with some probability. 
This technique facilitates the protocol to be secured against some major attacks, such as tracking, 
or physically determining a tag’s location. 
• Lightweight Secure Search Protocols: Lars et al. propose a lightweight secure 
search protocol in [Kulseng09]. The authors proposed three lightweight secure search protocols, 
all of which can prevent the adversary from learning the identity of tags or impersonating tags. In 
the basic protocol, the target tag responds to any query, so an adversary may replay any previous 
query and know the presence of a target tag. Their synchronization-based protocol mitigates the 
impact of replaying attacks by reducing the number of queries that a target tag should respond. 
Their best protocol is the multi-response protocol from which the adversary learns nothing about 
the target tag. Their protocols are built on top of Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) and 
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF), which are very efficient for implementation in low-cost 
tags. The authors use LFSR to generate random numbers for encrypting communication and reply 
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on PUF to authenticate the identity of tags. The author also performed evaluation of their protocol 
and the experimental results show that their solutions have negligible processing time and require 
no more than 1400 hardware gates. So, they are very suitable for low-cost RFID systems with at 
most 2000 gates available for security purposes.  
• Lee et al.’s Search Protocol: Lee et al. proposed a novel search protocol [Cai09] 
which allows for privately querying a particular tag. In their protocol, the server (or a reader) can 
efficiently query for a specific tag, without compromising the tag’s privacy. The authors first 
designed a two-round protocol and reduce it to a one-round protocol. In order to reduce it to a 
one-round protocol, they change the protocol such that the server generates a challenge instead of 
receiving it from a tag. According to their protocol, in order to prevent replay attack, each tag is 
allowed to keep a counter and update it each time a valid message is received. As a result, the 
received counter is always bigger than the stored one. After verifying the message from the 
server, a tag can respond to the server. Only the server in their system can generate valid 
messages. After the search protocol is executed, in order to make sure that the proper tag is 
responding to the server, a tag-to-server authentication protocol is invoked. The search protocol 
itself (without combining it with an authentication protocol) requires the server and a tag to 
perform two EC point multiplications each. The authors proved the security properties of the 
proposed search protocol.  The performance results of their experiment show the feasibility of the 
proposed protocols, even for a passive tag. According to the authors, their protocol outperform 
other privacy-preserving protocols.  
4.3. Summary 
In this section, we have reviewed a number of recently proposed RFID authentication and 
search protocols. We have also assessed their security and performance properties against the 
requirements identified in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 5: A Secure Serverless Search Protocol (S3PR) 
5.1. Introduction 
Usually an RFID system is composed of three main components: tag, reader and back-
end database. Every tag carries an object identifying data. When a tag receives a query from a 
reader, the tag transmits information to the reader using RF signals. The RFID reader reads and 
sometimes re-writes the stored data in a tag. After a reader queries a tag and receives information 
from the tag, the reader forwards the information to a Back-end server. The back-end server is 
powerful in computational capacity and manages lots of information related to each tag. Actually 
in server based system, back-end server plays an essential role and it is quite easy to check 
validity of tags or reader, which is very important for privacy protection and security issues.  
But the major drawback of the central server based system is that the readers always have 
to be connected to the server, which limits usage of RFID systems in remote locations where 
connectivity with server cannot be ensured. Besides, having a single database makes the whole 
system more vulnerable to privacy attacks. Central server has knowledge of all the tag secrets and 
tag information. Therefore, if the database is collapsed by an adversary, the entire user 
community’s privacy is jeopardized.  
An alternative, analogous to using central database, is to store all information of the 
central server in the reader. Because of the mobile nature of readers, they can be stolen. An 
adversary with a stolen reader will have access to the information found in the central database 
and the stolen reader can be easily compromised. The compromised reader may hold id and tag 
secret pair that can be loaded by an adversary into a blank tag. This fake tag can impersonate a 
legitimate tag and a reader cannot distinguish between the two. This is a severe breach in the 
security of an RFID system. 
Security and privacy protection is a major issue in another situation where a single reader 
and multiple tags are present. In all such practical situation, often a reader needs to determine 
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whether a particular tag exists within a group of tags. This is referred to as RFID searching. Tag 
searching with the help of a central database is not a challenging issue. However, without the help 
of the server, the reader has to search a tag entirely by itself. This type of tag searching is a 
critical task as it is vulnerable to privacy and security threats. For example, through the broadcast 
of a search query, a reader in a warehouse wants to search for a tag which belongs to a precious 
object. Now if the tag exists, it will reply and an adversary will become sure that a valuable object 
exists around it.  
RFID tag searching can be thought as an extension of RFID authentication. By 
authenticating every tag within a group, we can find out the desired tag. As the number of tags 
increase, the ability to search RFID tags becomes invaluable when the reader requires data from a 
few RFID tags rather than all the tags in the collection. If the reader has to authenticate each tag 
one at a time then the entire searching process will become very time consuming. Though tag 
searching is very useful in many RFID applications, secure searching methods have not received 
enough attention in research literatures so far. We firmly believe that in near future tag searching 
will be a significant issue in RFID based pervasive systems. 
In this chapter, we try to find solutions to the following questions: a) how can the readers 
search for a particular tag without the help of the server? b) how does a tag identify that the 
communicating reader is legitimate? Here, we propose a low cost, secured, serverless search 
protocol that provides solutions to the preceding questions. All these characteristics are ensured 
without a back end server which makes our proposal suitable for various application areas. A 
version of this proposal has been published in [Ahamed08b].  
In serverless system, a reader has to search, authenticate as well as provide security 
without the server’s intervention. This departure from a server based system may also reduce the 
cost for RFID system deployment in many areas where tag searching is done frequently, like 
inventory management, retail store product managements, supply chain management, E-passport, 
etc.  
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5.2. Existing Trivial Solutions 
Back-end database played an essential role in most early works on RFID security. 
Researchers came up with highly secure protocols but authentication was done mostly by the 
back-end server rather than the reader itself.  
Serverless RFID searching protocols were proposed in [Tan07] for the first time. 
According to this protocol, a reader wishes to find out whether a specific tag is within its vicinity 
by broadcasting ℎ
, 1||04  ⊕ 1 , 04 and 
 . Based on this search query, only the intended 
tag, if exists, reply with its encrypted . Other tags within the reader’s vicinity reply a random 
number based on certain probability. Tags authenticate the reader based on the search query and 
reader authenticates tags based on the reply “string”. Both valid query and valid replies are 
generated by legitimate parties. But here the reader has to do a lot of computation and their 
protocols are not strongly anonymous as they return tag  by performing XOR operation with 
hash value for authentication.  
5.3. Proposed Solution 
Our major contributions in this chapter are as follows: 
• We propose serverless, forward secure, anonymous and secure searching protocols 
for RFID tags. Our protocol makes use of the simple Pseudo random Number Generator (PRNG) 
and hash function to ensure security. 
• According to the protocols, the tag identifier is not passed to the reader in response to 
a reader’s query. Here, the tag sends certifying information to the reader in such a way that only 
the authorized reader is able to find out whether this is the desired tag. One unique feature of our 
protocol is that it is not vulnerable to single point-of-failure. 
• We consider security of both tags and readers as both can be attacked by adversaries. 
We consider all the major attacks and our search protocols are secure against those attacks.  
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5.3.1. System architecture 
An RFID system usually consists of three main components: a reader, a tag, and a back-
end database/server. The communication channel between the reader and the tag is wireless, 
while that between the reader and the database can be either wired or wireless. The tag presents 
its identification number or other stored information to the reader upon request. The reader will 
then communicate with the database. We assume that the communication between the reader and 
the database is secure due to the use of some kind of standard encryption technique. We further 
assume that an adversary can hear all transactions between a reader and a tag.  
However, our RFID system is a serverless system. Therefore, our serverless RFID system 
mainly consist two parties, one of them is the reader R and the other is a set of tags. A 
certification authority CA is involved in the system to certify readers and authorize them to 
particular tags. In this protocol, we focus on passive tags, which are low-cost and resource-
constrained. For example, the most popular passive tag, EPC Class 1 Gen 2, has at most 2000 
hardware gates available for security features [Juels05a]. 
5.3.2. Preliminaries 
All readers and tags have knowledge of a pseudorandom number generator 5.  and a 
function ℳ. . 5.  is a fairly simple random number generator that can be implemented at low 
cost. 5.  takes a seed as an argument and outputs a pseudorandom number according to its 
distribution. ℳ.  is used by all readers and tags to update the seed of the pseudorandom number 
generator by passing the current seed as input. We assume ℳ.  as an irreversible one way hash 
function. Therefore a current seed cannot be linked to its previous one.  
We refer an RFID reader as 7. Each 7 has a unique identifier 
 and a contact list ℒ. We 
will describe the contents of ℒ later. 7 obtains 
 and ℒ from a certification authority, 9:, after 
authenticating itself. The 9: is a trusted party who deploys all the RFID tags and authorizes any 
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RFID reader. For the sake of simplicity we assume that 7 and 9: communicate through a secure 
channel. Each tag  contains a unique  and a unique secret  in its nonvolatile memory. 
Table 5.1 Summary of notations for S3PR Protocols 
Symbol Meaning 
7 RFID reader  which wishes to execute search 
;<)4<; Desired RFID tag that the reader is searching for 
;<)4<; seed residing in the contact list of 7for the RFID tag ;<)4<; 
=>?@AB?> seed residing in the RFID tag ;<)4<; 
0;<)4<; Pseudorandom number generated by the reader 7 for tag ;<)4<;, based on ;<)4<; 
 ∗ All tags within the vicinity of the reader 7 
=∗  seed residing in each tag that is within the vicinity of the reader 7 
Subscripts are used to describe a particular 7 or  and their respective variables. Thus a 
particular RFID reader  will be 7 with an identifier 
 and contact list ℒ stored in its nonvolatile 
memory. An RFID tag D is 1 having a secret 1. The contact list ℒ contains information about the 
tags which 7 has access to. The information about each tag comprises a seed and the id of the 
tag. If 7 is authorized to access tags ,· · ·, F,  ℒ will take the following shape after 
authenticating itself to 9:, 
ℒ = G: ∙∙∙      ∶ ∙∙∙F: FK 
where, for any tag 1 and 1 ≤ D ≤ 0, 1 is a seed used by 7 to communicate with 1 
and 1 is 1’s identifier. 1 is initialized by 1 = 	
, 1 = ℎ	
 ∥ 1 where ℎ.  is a one 
way hash function and ∥ represents concatenate. Note that 7 does not know the tag secret 1. 7 
only knows the outcome of the function 	
, 1 as 1. The initial 1 is computed by 9: 
and stored in 7. The tag 1 will contain only one seed for its only one authorized reader 7. 
While 1 is deployed by 9:, 1 will get 	
, 1 = ℎ	
 ∥ 1 as =N from 9:. 1 stores =N 
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in its nonvolatile memory. We also assume that 9: cannot be compromised. We denote an 
adversary as O. The notations for serverless search protocols are summarized in Table 5.1. 
5.3.3. Attack model 
RFID systems face many threats launched by attackers. Attackers can be either active or 
passive. Passive attackers mainly launch eavesdropping attacks to capture the messages 
transmitted between the reader and the tag. They intend to learn some secret or private 
information about the communicating parties. This information can then be used for the purpose 
of tracking or finding secrets in other messages by utilizing bit manipulation or other offline 
methods. The active attackers can jam wireless communication, send out bogus messages, or 
compromise some tags. In our protocol, we focus on the majority of attacks launched by the 
active attackers. 
The major goal of an adversary in any RFID system is to counterfeit a real tag such that it 
has a small probability of being distinguished from the real one. Evidently, the fake tag embedded 
within the fake product can let the product to be identified as a legitimate one.  
For our serverless protocol, we denote an adversary as :P. The adversary can control a 
number of readers and tags. The reader and the tag controlled by the adversary is denoted as 7Q  
and Q , respectively. 7Q  is unauthorized to have access to any real tags as it is not connected with 
the backend server. Similarly, Q  is not valid as it has no idea about S and ID. We assume that the 
backend server cannot be compromised. Moreover we assume that all the entities such as tags, 
readers, adversaries, adversarial tags and adversarial readers have polynomially bounded 
resources. 
We assume that :P is more powerful than a passive attacker. Like a passive attacker, :P can 
eavesdrop on the channel between a valid reader and a valid tag. However, like an active 
attacker, :P can install a rouge reader 7Q that can communicate with a valid tag. In addition, :P can 
install a fake tag Q  to communicate with a legitimate reader. In both cases the ultimate goal of the 
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adversary is to counterfeit a tag with the learned information. In spite of these attacks, :P can 
launch hardware based physical attacks. A successful hardware based physical attack can give 
adversaries the ability to create fake tags, or impersonate a legitimate tag using some other 
device. But we will not study such attacks as hardware based physical attacks are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
5.3.4. Search Protocols 
Intuitively, to satisfy the two properties of secure search protocol, we need to encrypt 
both query and response in order to prevent an eavesdropper from learning the identity of the 
target tag. Meanwhile, the messages should be changed for each search in order to prevent an 
adversary from replaying them. Based on these ideas, we design several secure search protocols. 
Each of our protocols consists of two phases, a preliminary setup phase and an online search 
phase. In the setup phase, the reader and all the tags are preloaded with some secrets. Then, in the 
search phase, the reader and the tag exchange their secrets for the reader to detect the presence of 
the target tag. Next, we discuss the detail of the online search phase. Suppose, a reader 7 is 
searching for a tag denoted as ;<)4<;. One way of searching may be according to our Search 
Protocol 1 which we name as Simple Search Protocol (see figure 5.1). 
Search Protocol 1: Simple Search Protocol 
(1) 7 →   ∗  ∶   S
TU 
   
(2) 7               ∶   9TVW  0;<)4<; = 5;<)4<;  
(3)  ∗              ∶    =  5=∗ 
(4) 7 ←   ∗  ∶       
(5) 7               ∶   for each  received from each tag in the group 
(6)   if  ==  0;<)4<; then  
(7)     ;<)4<;  TW0  
(8)         else  
(9)     ;<)4<;  0T TW0   
Figure 5.1 Simple Search Protocol 
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One main shortcoming of this protocol is that it is a one side authenticated search 
protocol. In this type of search, tags do not authenticate the readers before replying. So tags 
cannot know whether they are replying to an adversary or to a valid reader. But the tags should 
reply only to the authorized reader. Here the tags reply upon receiving a search query. So by 
querying a group of tags, an adversary may succeed in his/her attempt of searching a particular 
valuable tag, if that tag is present. Therefore, the tags need to authenticate the reader before 
replying. So when 7 broadcasts the search query, all tags, including the tag which satisfies the 
query, need to authenticate 7 before replying. 
Search Protocol 2: Enhanced Search Protocol 
(1) 7             ∶     9TVW  0;<)4<; = 5;<)4<; 
(2) 7 →   ∗∶     S
TU  0;<)4<;   
(3)  ∗            ∶     = 5=∗ 
(4)         if  ==  0;<)4<; then 
(5)   Let  = ℳ=∗ 
(6)      Let ! = 5 
(7)     =>?@AB?> = ℳ  
(8)   7 ← ;<)4<;  ∶  ! 
(9)        else 
(10)   7 ← 1  ∶  
0 with probablity o 
(11) 7             ∶    Let  = ℳ;<)4<; 
(12)        Let  = 5  
(13)        for each 
VT0 from the group of tags 
(14)        if  is equal to a 
VT0 then  
(15)    ;<)4<; =  ℳ     
(16)    ;<)4<;  TW0    
(17)        else  
(18)    ;<)4<;  0T TW0     
Figure 5.2 Enhanced Search Protocol 
Moreover, since seeds are not updated in both parties after each search, the tags will reply 
with the same answers in subsequent search queries. If an adversary queries with a previously 
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learned 
, tags will reply with the same values as before. Although the adversary will not be able 
to figure out which tag the reader was searching for, the adversary will be sure that the same 
search is taking place. By querying several times with different 
, the adversary can learn a 
pattern for queries and replies. 
To solve the problems of simple search protocol, we can set up our goals for searching as 
follows. A tag should respond only to its authorized reader. A reader should query only the tags it 
is authorized to access to. Both parties (i.e. tags and reader) should update their seeds after a 
successful search. All these properties are incorporated in our next search protocol which is 
Search Protocol 2  which we name as Enhanced Search Protocol (see figure 5.2). In this 
protocol, a reader issues a query in a way that only a legitimate tag can understand and a tag 
replies in such a manner that only an authorized reader can understand. 
In this protocol, 7 computes 0;<)4<; and broadcasts it to find out ;<)4<;. All tags 
receiving 0;<)4<; compare this number with the pseudorandom number  that is produced by 
using their own =∗. If a match occurs, a tag will be sure of the reader’s authority. In fact only 
legitimate ;<)4<; can find a match because only an authorized reader can generate valid 
0;<)4<;. Hence after authenticating the reader, ;<)4<; will reply with next pseudorandom 
number ! from the sequence and update its own =>?@AB?>. Now 7 computes the next 
pseudorandom number  from its sequence and compares it with each received 
VT0. If any 

VT0 is equal to , then the reader can be sure that the tag is valid. Consequently reader 7 
now updates the seed for ;<)4<;. Security analysis for this protocol is discussed in the next 
subsection. 
In enhanced search protocol, we let some other tags reply in addition to the desired tag to 
put the actual reply in disguise. Each tag that receives a search query will have some probability o 
of replying with a random number. So by observing the tag replies, an adversary cannot recognize 
the tag that the reader is searching for.  
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5.3.5. Interaction diagram 
The following figure (see figure 5.3) shows a detailed interaction diagram of enhanced 
search protocol. 
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Figure 5.3 Interaction diagram of Enhanced Search Protocol when yz is searching tag {x 
|}~ zu z 
Step 1: Initiating search for tag {x by broadcasting ~x 
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Step 2: All tags receiving the search query, within the vicinity of the reader, compute next 
pseudorandom number based on their seeds. 
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updated. 
 
Step 3: seed is updated in {x (black colored tag) as  matches with ~x . Here, updated seed is 
denoted as bold uvvw{x. {x replies with next pseudorandom number . While some other tags, 
with probability , reply with random number ~w without updating their seed. 
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seed is updated 
for tag r in 
reader’s contact  
list. 
Tag is found 
Step 4: Reader again generates next pseudorandom number for tag {x and compares the number with 
the replies sent by different tags. A match occurs for . So reader updates the seed for tag {x and it 
becomes sure about the existence of the desired tag. Here updated seed is denoted as bold uvvwx. 
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5.4. Protocol Analysis 
In this section, we analyze our proposed authentication protocol against different types of 
attacks. For every attack, we describe how the attack is performed by an adversary and we 
explain how our protocol protects against the attack. 7 and 1 are referred to as a legitimate 
reader and tag. 
5.4.1. Security analysis 
Tracking: Tracking attack in searching is slightly different from the one found in 
authentication related security literatures. In case of tag searching, an adversary cannot pick a 
particular tag to track. Rather, the adversary can only track a tag that has been searched for by a 
legitimate reader. For example, through the broadcast of a search query, a reader in a shopping 
mall wants to search for a tagged object, which may be worth thousands of dollars. Now if the 
object exists within the mall, the tag within the object will reply and an adversary will become 
aware that a valuable object exists around him/her. Therefore, the attacker may be able to track 
the location of the object and find out which store or owner the object belongs to.  
Furthermore, the adversary has to iteratively query every tag in a group individually 
before determining what tag he is tracking. These reasons increase the difficulty of launching a 
tracking attack via the RFID search protocol. The very act of replying to a query can be used to 
identify a tag. So as long as a search query produces a unique reply, the reply becomes an 
identifier for a particular tag. Encryption does not solve the problem, since encryption only 
prevents an adversary from learning the content of a message, but not that a message has been 
sent. Our enhanced search protocol is resistant against tracking.  
Let us consider the following attack. :P eavesdrops on the transaction between a reader 
7 and a group of tags. So :P knows the queries and replies. :P will not be able to reverse compute 
the replies or learn the query but it can certainly be sure that a searching has been taken place. 
However :P cannot be sure which tag ;<)4<; the reader was searching for, since besides the 
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desired tag other tags also replied with probability o.  Now :P can replay previously learned 
0;<)4<; to track ;<)4<;. After the previous successful searching between 7 and ;<)4<;, both 
parties have changed their seeds. So 0;<)4<;, sent by the adversary, does not match with the one 
computed by ;<)4<;. As a result, ;<)4<; responds with a random number. At the same time 
other tags will also reply with random numbers. If :P continues to query with different 0;<)4<;, 
all tags including the desired tag will reply randomly. Therefore :P is not able to track a tag. 
Cloning: Consider the following cloning attack.  7 queries to search a tag ;<)4<;. If 
;<)4<; is present it will reply. At the same time other tags will also reply. Suppose, :P finds out 
the tag the reader was searching for. Now if :P is able to clone ;<)4<;, then :P can fool  7 by not 
replying or even giving a false reply. As a result, 7 will assume that the desired tag ;<)4<; does 
not exist in this group. In our protocol, this attack is impossible as :P is unable to find out the tag 
the reader was searching for.  
Eavesdropping: Here :P observes all the queries between a reader and tags. The goal of :P 
is to use the data to impersonate a fake reader  7 or a fake tag 1. Our protocol is powerful 
against this attack. In our protocol :P will not be able to find out the expected reply of the reader 
as more than one tag will reply. :P can only observe  0;<)4<;  send by the reader. With this little 
knowledge :P cannot impersonate  7 or 1, because after the last successful searching between  7 
and ;<)4<;, both of them have updated their seeds. So both of them,  7 and ;<)4<;, are now 
expecting new values which are not known by :P. Therefore by eavesdropping :P cannot launch a 
replay attack by using previous values. 
Forward Secrecy: Forward secrecy means that an adversary will not be able to realize 
any previous output transmitted by the entity even if he/she compromises that entity. Enhanced 
search protocol ensures forward secrecy. The secret  of the desired tag, ;<)4<;, shared 
between the tag and the reader, is updated each time using irreversible one way hash function. 
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After compromising a valid entity, :P cannot realize earlier responses based on the former secret 
 as it cannot derive the former secret s from the current one. 
Privacy Protection: Users carrying various tagged items do not want to hamper their own 
privacy. If an adversary comes by any private information of the tag, by querying or 
eavesdropping, it may cause several vulnerabilities to the owner’s day to day life. Our protocol 
protects users’ privacy strongly. According to our enhanced search protocol, a tag never sends its 
own id to anyone, not even to the authorized reader. The tag sends its responses in disguise so 
that only an authorized reader can identify the tag. Moreover, along with the desired tag, 
additional tags also reply to the readers search query to preserve anonymity of the desired tag. 
5.4.2. Cost analysis of enhanced search protocol 
There are only two hash functions, ∙,∙ and ℳ∙, involved in our Enhanced Search 
Protocol. However ∙,∙ is used only at the deployment phase of tags when CA deploys all the 
RFID tags and authorizes the reader. So, it is logical to estimate the cost of our protocol based on 
the computation of ℳ∙ hash function. Moreover, since readers have high computation capacity, 
we calculate the cost of our protocol from the tag’s perspective. From the Enhanced Search 
Protocol described above, we see that ℳ∙ is executed twice, first in line 5 and second in line 7. 
So, the cost for our protocols is little higher than alternative protocol [Tan07] which require the 
tag to perform only one hash function. The additional hash functions allow our protocols to be 
serverless and yet avoid exposing the tag secret to the reader. Considering communication cost, 
assuming that both reader and tag ids have the same length, the search protocol requires (|0| +
 |
0| +  |!|) bits, where |0| is the length of random numbers 0 or 01. |
0| is the length of 

0 or 
01 and |!| is the length of ! (see Enhanced Search Protocol, figure 5.2). 
5.5. Comparison with Other Protocols 
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There have not been many attempts to produce a secure search protocol for RFID 
systems. In [Tan07], Tan et al. produced a series of search solutions that require very little 
storage, and can be distributed without an explicit need for a back-end server. Our solutions offer 
similar functions as Tan’s, asking very little in terms of memory usage by tags or readers, and in 
addition we provide better security features. As tag search technique is one type of authentication 
and there are few search protocols proposed so far, we will compare our proposed search 
protocols with some existing famous authentication techniques along with other proposed search 
protocol [Tan07] based on the security features and other additional features. 
Table 5.2 Comparison between different protocols 
Protocols 
Privacy 
Protection 
Anti-
Tracking 
Anti-
Cloning 
Synchron
ization 
Forward 
Secrecy 
Serverless 
feature 
Scalability 
Assurance 
Seo-Lee-Kim 
[Seo06a] 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Seo-Lee-Kim 
[Seo06b] 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
OSK 
[Ohkubo03] 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
YA-TRAP 
[Tsudik06] 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
YA-TRAP+ 
[Molnar04] 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Av-
ech[Avoine05] 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Chiu-Bo-Qun 
[Tan07] 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Serverless 
search protocol 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
The protocol proposed by Seo et. al [Seo06a] provides high security. However, external 
intervention is required in order to perform ownership transfer, which is considered as a major 
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flaw of this protocol. Another highly scalable and highly secure protocol was proposed by the 
same authors in [Seo06b]. But this protocol has problem regarding untraceability and other 
security issues such as DoS attack. Another famous but novel authentication protocol is YA-
TRAP [Tsudik06]. YA TRAP is secure against tracking and cloning attack and it does not require 
any computational overhead. However, in YA-TRAP, a simple DoS attack can be performed, 
exhausting the capability of the tag to respond to a legitimate reader. Moreover, this protocol does 
not assure forward secrecy. YA-TRAP+ [Molnar04] solves the problem of YA-TRAP, but 
inherits from it the inability to provide forward secrecy. The protocol of Avoine and Oechslin 
[Avoine05] guarantees firm security such as untraceability, forward secrecy, anti - cloning 
property. This protocol is also scalable but it offers no protection against DoS attack. The 
protocol proposed in [Tan07], is highly secure against most of the attacks. But this serverless 
protocol is not scalable. 
Our proposed Enhanced Search Protocol is secure against tracking, cloning, 
eavesdropping, and physical attack. Moreover it can ensure forward secrecy, privacy protection, 
synchronization between tag and reader. But the biggest strength of our protocol is that it is 
serverless and it requires much less computation than the techniques mentioned in table 5.2. The 
serverless and lightweight nature of our search protocol makes it suitable for application areas 
where back-end servers are unreachable or unavailable. Moreover, S3PR protocol is not 
vulnerable to single point-of-failure. 
5.6. Application Areas of S3PR 
In this section we discuss two potential application areas of S3PR protocol. 
1. Mishandled bag search within Airports: Passengers suffer a lot due to inefficient bag 
handling system in the airports. Passengers have to deal with customer service representative in 
search of their lost baggage. The industry refers to this as “Mishandled bag”. Every missing or 
mishandled bag costs the responsible airline approximately $80 to $120, or an average of $100 
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per bag. And yearly this figure rises to approximately $146 million. Moreover, this type of events 
degrades the reputation of the responsible airline. However a simple, cost-effective, efficient 
solution to Mishandled Bag can be achieved using our search protocol. Whenever a passenger 
arrives to customer service representative to report about missing bags, the representative can get 
the tag ids of bags from airport operations database (AODB) and can request a search operation. 
Mobile readers can be used to identify the exact location of the missing bag by directing those 
readers to different location within airport.  
2. User Interactions in a smart space: A smart space typically contains multiple smart 
objects offering several invisible services. Users’ personal devices are usually used to interact 
with the smart space.  Discovering invisible services securely and authenticating the users are 
interesting research problems in the smart space domain. Our approach offers promising solutions 
to both of these problems. Iconic images embedded with RFID tags can advertise invisible 
services and user terminals can be equipped with an RFID reader. A user can search for a specific 
service (tags in this case) or can initiate a service by touching the tag. Considering the pre-
negotiation between the reader and the tags, secure discovery and searching mechanism can be 
easily achieved applying our protocol. 
5.7. Summary 
The application areas of RFID systems are unlimited. In spite of this, secure RFID tag 
searching has not gathered much attention till now. Bur it will become very important when RFID 
tags will be deployed at a larger scale. Therefore, in this chapter we introduced various problems 
incurred while performing secure serverless tag search. Moreover, we analyzed different attacks 
that can be launched against RFID tag searching. Finally we proposed a secure serverless RFID 
tag search protocol that can safeguard against the major attacks without the server’s intervention.  
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Chapter 6: A Scalable and Efficient Search Protocol (S-
Search) 
6.1. Introduction 
RFID holds the potential of changing how businesses operate today but its 
implementation is not straightforward. Since RFID tags are extremely constrained in time and 
space, enforcing high level of security with excessive cryptographic computation is not possible. 
Secured mechanisms for tag authentication have been in the midst of researcher’s interest for 
almost a decade. A number of challenges such as security/privacy concern, scalability, high cost, 
reliability of the technology, efficient performance of the system, and even some more issues 
need to be addressed.  
In RFID systems, tags equipped within different objects have unique identification 
information. This information is applicable in various fields such as supply chain management, 
and product maintenance etc. In all such practical implementations, often a reader needs to 
determine efficiently whether a particular tag exists within a group of tags no matter how large 
the size of the tag set is. This is referred to as scalable RFID tag searching. RFID tag searching is 
one sort of extension of RFID authentication, which has not been given much attention so far. But 
with the massive deployment of RFID technology, tag searching will become a very significant 
issue.  
In practical RFID systems, the number of tags within the system is extensive. Searching a 
particular RFID tag among this immense number of tags needs to be efficient. Which means that 
searching of tags need to be scalable. Scalability means that a reader will be able to search a tag 
with constant computational time regardless of the number of tags that is owned by it. Non-
scalable tag search protocols are not feasible as they are not implementable in real life RFID 
systems that consist of large number of tags.  
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In this chapter, we try to find solutions to the following questions: a) how can a reader 
search a particular tag within a set of tags efficiently? b) how can the search protocol maintain 
scalability? Here, we propose a scalable, low cost, and secure search protocol that provides 
solutions to the preceding questions. A version of this proposal has been published in [Hoque10]. 
6.2. Existing Trivial Solutions 
The assortment of research literature on RFID searching is inadequate although it is a 
major issue in its real life implementation. We will mainly concentrate on the search protocols 
proposed so far in [Tan07] and [Ahamed08b] that are relevant to our proposal.  
Serverless RFID search protocols were proposed in [Tan07] for the first time. According 
to this protocol, a reader wishes to find out whether a specific tag is within its vicinity by 
broadcasting ℎ
, 1||04  ⊕  1  , 04 and 
. Based on this search query, only the intended 
tag, if exists, reply with its encrypted . Other tags within the reader’s vicinity reply a random 
number based on certain probability. Tags authenticate the reader based on the search query and 
reader authenticates tags based on the reply “string”. Both valid query and valid replies are 
generated by legitimate parties.  
Another serverless search protocol was proposed in [Ahamed08b]. In this paper, the 
authors proposed different search protocols in which tag identifier is not passed to the reader in 
response to a reader’s query. Tag sends certifying information to the reader in such a way that 
only the authorized reader is able to find out whether this is the desired tag. However, both of 
these search protocols lack scalability when the number of tags increases drastically in the 
system.  
Another major drawback of both of these protocols is, multiple tags reply at the same 
time when reader broadcasts a search query. This creates data and signal collision in the 
communication channel between the tag and the reader. Because of collision, those tags whose 
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data were distorted, needs to reply again. As a result, both of these protocols are not efficient with 
respect to time. 
In an RFID system, a collision occurs when multiple tags try to transmit data to the 
reader at the same time. This results in the reader being unable to obtain any useful information. 
Prior works [Bonuccelli06, Cha05, Lee05 and Micic05] have focused on improving protocols to 
reduce collisions. However these solutions are ultimately bounded by the number of tags.  
Another approach is to use probabilistic techniques to determine some features of a large 
collection of RFID tags. These include methods to estimate the cardinality of a set of tags 
[Kodialam06], and to determine popular categories of tags [Sheng08]. For a reader to 
successfully receive data from multiple tags, anti-collision protocols must be designed so that 
replied data from multiple tags will not be distorted because of collision. In general, two 
approaches are used to regulate collision. The first is based on the ALOHA protocol [Metcalfe75, 
Lee05, Schoute83, Vogt02, and Wieselthier89]. A representative protocol used in RFID systems 
is the framed ALOHA [Metcalfe75], a variation of ALOHA [Abramson70]. In this protocol, a 
frame is divided into multiple time slots. The communication is initialized when the reader 
broadcasts a frame size, i.e., the number of slots in the frame. Every RFID tag responds only in a 
particular slot in the current frame. The reader can successfully receive data in a certain slot if 
only one tag picks the slot for transmission. This process is repeated until all data are collected.  
The second approach uses the tree traversal technique [Choi04, and Cidon88]. The reader 
broadcasts an ID prefix, and those tags whose IDs match the prefix will respond. If a collision is 
detected, the reader will append ‘0’ or ‘1’ to the prefix and send new prefixes again. It is 
equivalent to traversing a binary tree, where each tag’s ID is a leaf node. The expansion of prefix 
stops if only one tag responds. 
In this chapter we propose a scalable tag search protocol using Slotted ALOHA based 
communication between legitimate tag and reader. We present a lightweight solution that does 
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not require expensive tag hardware such as an accurate on-chip timer or cryptographic MAC 
functions which are unavailable on passive RFID tags. 
6.3. Proposed Solution 
The objective of secure RFID searching should be: the reader will search a specific RFID 
tag which he is authorized to access. Tags will reply with valid answers only if the reader is 
legitimate. Our major contributions are as follows: 
• We propose scalable, forward secure, anonymous, and efficient search protocol, (S-
Search), for searching RFID tags efficiently within a system. 
• The S-Search protocol does not require the reader to collect ids from each RFID tag, 
but is still able to accurately find out a specific RFID tag. 
• The major focus of this search protocol is to keep the searching scalable so that it can 
implemented efficiently in real life/practical RFID systems. 
• Our Searching technique provides privacy protection by neither broadcasting tag ids 
in public, nor revealing ids to the RFID reader. 
6.3.1. System architecture 
Usually, the RFID system consists of wireless tag, T, wireless reader, R, and back-end 
database. A certification authority CA is involved in the system to certify readers and authorize 
them to particular tags. We discuss the roles of different components of an RFID system and the 
communication techniques between them. 
Tag: Each tag T is comprised of an IC chip and antenna. Tags can be of two types. There 
are active tags, which have a battery, and passive tags, which have no battery. We focus on the 
passive tag, which is expected to be the most common type of RFID tags. In our system, each tag 
is able to communicate with one reader at a time. 
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Reader: A reader R is a device that sends some query using radio frequency signal to a 
tag, receives the information sent by the tag and performs some important computation on those 
data. 
Server: By server we mean a secure server. It has a database and manages various types 
of information related to each T. The server resolves the id of T from the information sent by T 
through authenticated R. 
Communication: The wireless communications between the reader and the tag is 
assumed to be vulnerable to eavesdropping. Communications between the reader and the 
Certification Authority (that we refer as Trusted Authority - TC in the rest of the chapter) are 
assumed to be conducted over a secure channel. 
6.3.2. Problem Definition 
We assume that a server has a set of tags. Each RFID tag has a unique id. A set of tags 
once created is assumed to be static which means that no tags are added or removed from the set. 
The problem is to search a particular RFID tag among this set of tags. 
Protocol Goals. The goal of the server is to search a specific tag remotely, quickly and 
efficiently so that the search can be scalable even with large number of tags in the system. 
Adversary Goals. The goal of an adversary in any RFID system is to counterfeit a real tag 
with its real data such that it can only be distinguished from the real one with small probability. 
Evidently, this fake tag can let a fake product to be identified as an authentic one just by 
embedding the fake tag into the fake product. We denote an adversary is denoted as :P. The 
adversary can control a number of readers and tags. Each reader and tag controlled by :P is 
denoted as 7Qand Q , respectively. 7Q  is unauthorized to have access to real tags as it cannot get any 
tag secret t and id (see section 7.3.3) from CA. Similarly, Q  is not valid as it does not have secret 
and identifying information of any tag. Moreover, we assume that all the entities (tags, readers, 
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TC including adversary, adversarial readers and adversarial tags) have polynomially bounded 
resources. 
Attack Model. We assume that :P is more formidable than a passive attacker. In addition 
to eavesdropping on the channel between a valid reader and a valid tag, :P, like an active attacker, 
can install a rogue reader 7Q  that can communicate with a valid tag. Even :P can also install a fake 
tag Q  to communicate with an authorized reader. In both cases, the adversary wants to counterfeit 
a tag with the learned information. Furthermore :P can launch physical attacks. However 
hardware-based defenses against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this proposal. 
6.3.3. Preliminaries 
Table 6.1 Notations for S-Search protocol 
Symbol Meaning  ∗ Set of RFID tags ;<)4<; RFID tag for which the reader executes a search 
operation within T*   0 Number of tags within T*  ℎ.  One way hash function & Slot position within frame S7 Bit Record generated by the reader with the replies 
of tags  Tag secret of Ti ;<)4<; Tag secret of ;<)4<; ;<)4<;  id of  ;<)4<; 
0 First m bits of a random number  First m bits of number  
Like many other earlier research, here we have assumed that RFID tags are capable of 
performing cryptographic hash function. But cryptographic hash function requires additional 
gates to be implemented within the tag. This eventually increases price per tag. So due to the 
higher production cost, most RFID tags do not provide these hash function. Some common hash 
functions like MD4, SHA-1, SHA-256 requires between 7350 and 10868 additional gates 
[Feldhofer06]. So majority of the proposed protocols can be used with expensive RFID tags 
which are likely to be attached with more valuable items. 
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We refer an RFID reader denoted as R. The TC is a trusted party who deploys all the 
RFID tags and authorizes any RFID reader. For the sake of simplicity we assume that R and TC 
communicate through a secure channel. According to our proposal, Each RFID tag T contains a 
unique value id a unique secret t in its nonvolatile memory. We denote the frame size as f and the 
random number generated by the reader/tag as r. Both the server and the reader contains a table of 
tag entries. Each entry of the table contains the corresponding tag id and the associated tag secret 
t. The necessary notations for S-Search protocol are summarized in table 6.1. 
Our communication model is based on the slotted ALOHA. We assume that an RFID 
reader is able to distinguish the slots with no reply, single reply, or multiple replies. We define 
these slots as empty slot, single-reply slot, or collision slot respectively. In our approach, every 
tag does not transfer the long id, but a short random bit string (usually < 10 bits, which we denote 
as m), as long as the RFID reader can detect the presence of the signal. In this proposal, we 
assume that RFID tags resolve collisions using a slotted ALOHA scheme [Hernandez01]. In our 
protocol, the server sends a frame size f and a random number r to the reader. The reader 
broadcasts (f, r) and ℎ
⨁;<)4<; to all tags. Each RFID tag uses the random number r and its 
id to hash to a slot position SP between [1, f] to return their reply where, 
& = ℎ⨁
 mod  
The tags simply reply with a few random bits signifying the tag has chosen that slot. In 
other words, instead of the reader receiving 
{… | id1 | 0 |...| collision | 0 |…}, 
where 0 indicates no tag has picked that slot to reply, and collision indicates multiple tags 
trying to reply in the same slot, the reader will receive 
{…| random bits | 0 |… | random bits | 0 |…} 
This is more efficient since the tag id is much longer than the random bits transmitted. 
This is even more secure as the tags do not have to transmit id to the reader. So an adversary 
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cannot find out id’s of tags by eavesdropping within the channels. From the reply, the reader can 
generate the Bit Record (BR) 
BR = {…| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | …}, 
Here, 1 indicates one tag has picked that slot. The server knows all the ids and tag secrets 
of all the tags and the parameters (f, r). Therefore, it will be able to determine the resulting Bit 
Record (BR) for an intact set of tags ahead of time. The intuition behind this is to let the server 
pick a (f, r) for the reader to broadcast to the set of tags. The server uses the Bit Record (BR) 
generated by itself and Bit Record (BR) returned from the reader to determine whether the 
searched tag is present or not. 
6.3.4. Search protocol 
Algorithm 1: Interaction between server and reader 
1. Server sends (f, r) to the reader R 
2. R executes Algorithm 4 
3. All nearby tags executes Algorithm 3 
4. Compute Slot Position for the desired tag ;<)4<;by 
&;<)4<; = ℎ;<)4<;⨁
 mod  
5. Receive Bit Record (BR) from R 
6.            if S7 &;<)4<; = 1 then 
7.                     ;<)4<; is present 
8.            else 
9.                     ;<)4<; is not present 
Figure 6.1 Algorithm for interaction between server and reader in S-Search Protocol 
Algorithm 2: Interaction between reader and tags 
1. Reader broadcasts (f, r) and ℎ
⨁;<)4<; to all tags  
2. Reader R executes Algorithm 4 
3. Each tag Ti (where i = 1 to n) executes Algorithm 3 
4. Reader returns Bit Record (BR) to the server 
Figure 6.2 Algorithm for interaction between reader and tags in S-Search Protocol 
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm executed by tags 
1. Receive (f, r) and ℎ
⨁;<)4<; from R 
2. Each tag Ti (where i = 1 to n) Compute Slot Position 
(SP) by & = ℎ⨁
 mod  
3. while R broadcasts Slot Position (SP) do 
4.        if  (SP == SPi) then 
5.              compute ℎ
⨁  
6.              if  ℎ
⨁ = ℎ
⨁;<)4<;  then 
7.                      return 	ℎ⨁⨁
 to R 
8.              else 
9.                      return 
0 to R with probability o 
Figure 6.3 Algorithm executed by the tags in S-Search Protocol 
Algorithm 4: Algorithm executed by the reader R 
1. Compute Bit Record (BR) of length f  
2. Initialize all entries of BR to 0 
3. Compute ℎ;<)4<;⨁;<)4<;⨁
 for ;<)4<; 
4. for Slot Position SP =1 to f do 
5.        if receive reply or collision then 
6.              set BR[SP] = 1 
7.              if (reply = ℎ;<)4<;⨁;<)4<;⨁
 then 
8.                          ;<)4<;  is present 
9.              else 
10.                         ;<)4<;  is not present 
Figure 6.4 Algorithm executed by the reader in S-Search Protocol 
6.3.5. Protocol description 
In case of single RFID tag search, the reader first broadcasts a frame size and a random 
number, (f, r), together with ;<)4<; =  ℎ
⨁;<)4<; to all the tags. Each RFID tag  uses its 
own tag secret ti and r to generate  =  ℎ
⨁. If Vi is equal to ;<)4<;, tag Ti becomes sure 
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that the reader is searching for itself. Only the desired tag returns first m bits of 
ℎ;<)4<;⨁;<)4<;⨁
 during the slot position specified by 
&;<)4<; = ℎ;<)4<;⨁
 mod . And all other tags reply random number with probability o 
during the slot position specified by & = ℎ⨁
 T . The reader searching for tag ;<)4<; 
calculates ℎ;<)4<;⨁;<)4<;⨁
 ahead of time. At the time of receiving replies from different 
tags, the reader checks the content of slot position &;<)4<;. If the received content matches with 
first m bits of ℎ;<)4<;⨁;<)4<;⨁
, the reader becomes sure that ;<)4<; is present. Now 
reader forms the Bit Record (BR) of length f (frame size) to transmit to the server. Initially reader 
assigns 0 to all the slot positions. However, the reader stores 1 in all those slot positions in which 
it receive a reply (either ℎ;<)4<;⨁;<)4<;⨁
 or random number). We assume that the frame 
size (f) is large enough and there are more slot positions within the frame than total number of 
tags (i.e. f > n). Reader stores 1 in those slots in which it identifies a collision. Therefore, some 
slot position of the BR contains 0 and some contains 1. But the adversary cannot find out in which 
slot position the desired tag replied. This technique of bit assignment allows our search protocol 
to be secured against some major attacks which we will discuss in section 8.  The Bit Record is 
transmitted to the server. We assume that the channel between server and reader is secure.  
Next, the server only checks the slot position &;<)4<; of the BR to find out whether the 
desired tag is present or not. Slot position &;<)4<; containing 1 indicates that the desired tag is 
present. Algorithm 1(figure 6.1) shows the overall interaction between the server and the reader. 
Algorithm 2 (figure 6.2) shows the interaction between the reader and tags. Each tag in the set 
executes algorithm 3 (figure 6.3) independently. Algorithm 4 (figure 6.4) generates the Bit 
Record (BR) and returns it to the server. In algorithm 2, we see that tag does not need to return the 
tag id to the reader. They return a much shorter number (m bits), either random number or 
ℎ;<)4<;⨁;<)4<;⨁
, to inform their presence.  
6.4. Protocol Analysis 
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In this section, we analyze our proposed search protocol against different types of attacks.  
6.4.1. Security analysis 
Tracking: Our search protocol is resistant against tracking. Consider the following 
attack. :P eavesdrops on the transaction between a reader 7 and tags. So he knows the queries and 
replies. He will not be able to reverse compute the replies or learn the query but he can certainly 
be sure that a searching has taken place. However he cannot be sure, which tag ;<)4<;, reader 
was searching for. Since besides the desired tag some other tags also replied with probability o.  
Adversary can find out which tag replied in which slot but he will not be able to determine what 
were replied by the tags. Since outputs of all tags will seem to be pure random to the adversary. 
Cloning: Consider the following cloning attack. 7 queries to search a tag ;<)4<;. If 
;<)4<; is present it will reply. At the same time other tags will also reply. Suppose, :P finds out 
the tag the reader was searching for. Now if he is able to clone ;<)4<;, then he can fool  7 by 
not replying or even giving a false reply. As a result, 7 will assume that the desired tag ;<)4<; 
does not exist in this group. In our protocol, this is impossible. Because :P is unable to find out, 
which tag the reader was searching for.  
Eavesdropping: Here :P observes all the queries between a reader and tags. And his goal 
is to use the data to impersonate a fake reader  7 or a fake tag 1. Our protocol is powerful against 
this attack. In our protocol :P will not be able to find out the expected reply of the tags as more 
than one tag will reply. He can only observe the data send by the reader. With his little knowledge 
he cannot impersonate  7 or 1. The output of the desired tag consists of the random number, tag 
secret t, and id. The tag secret and id is not known to the adversary. So he is not capable to 
generate the new outputs of the desired tag. Therefore by eavesdropping :P cannot launch a replay 
attack by using previous values. 
6.5. Comparison with Other Protocols 
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In this section (table 6.2), we compare S-Search Protocol with some existing protocols. 
Table 6.2 Comparison between different protocols 
Protocols Privacy Protection 
Anti-
Tracking 
Anti-
Cloning 
Synchron
ization 
Forward 
Secrecy 
Scalability 
Assurance 
Seo-Lee-Kim 
[Seo06a] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seo-Lee-Kim 
[Seo06b] Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OSK 
[Ohkubo03] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
YA-TRAP 
[Tsudik06] Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
YA-TRAP+ 
[Molnar04] Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Av-
ech[Avoine05] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chiu-Bo-Qun 
[Tan07] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Serverless 
search 
protocol 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
S-Search 
Protocol Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6.6. Summary 
In this chapter, we propose scalable and efficient RFID tag search protocol that can 
safeguard against some major attacks without performing complex cryptographic computation. 
This protocol only requires tags to be capable of generating hash function and performing XOR 
operation. Our approach differs from prior works in that our technique does not require the reader 
to collect the id from every tag. Also it requires little computation to search a particular tag which 
makes our protocol scalable and highly suitable for practical large scale RFID systems. 
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Chapter 7: A Hexagonal Architecture for Tag Search (EDSA) 
7.1. Introduction 
Several researches were conducted to ensure security and privacy of consumers and it has 
brought some fruitful outcomes. Numbers of privacy problem were identified in [Rieback06, 
Juels05b] and many privacy preserving cryptographic techniques were identified in [Juels05b]. 
The definition of strong privacy given by Juels and Weis in [Juels06] seems to have a conflicting 
relation with scalability. According to Juels and Weis in [Juels06], private tag identification 
involves decryption of the ID of the tag being identified by exhaustive search. Definitely, this 
technique will not ensure scalability when the number of tags will increase. But both strong 
privacy protection and scalability are very important for the real life implementation of RFID 
technology. 
One such real life situation is emergency evacuation system. In such circumstances RFID 
tag can be used to keep track of each and every person stuck in danger, persons who are unable to 
leave the danger premises and persons who are undetected. This RFID system will raise 
scalability issues if typical RFID identification techniques and infrastructure is used. One solution 
to this problem can be suggested by using distributed architecture of [Solanas07] which ensures 
scalability by using typical hash lock scheme. In this chapter we propose an Enhanced 
Distributed Scalable Architecture (EDSA) that provides even more scalability and security by 
using serverless tag authentication [Ahamed08c] and search protocol [see chapter 5]. The use of 
serverless search and authentication protocol ensure efficiency by incorporating a back-end 
server. A version of this proposal has been published in [Ahamed08a]. 
The main reason of using serverless search protocol is: it reduces set up, maintenance 
cost and mostly traffic from reader to back-end server. Back-end server is now devoted to some 
higher level maintenance of real life application as it hands over the responsibility of 
authenticating and searching tags to readers. It is practical and feasible to use serverless search 
70 
and authentication in emergency evacuation system as it can operate without the involvement of 
server. 
The goal of this chapter is to discuss an RFID system architecture to solve the scalability 
issues in practical application scenarios. It starts by an introduction to the scalability requirements 
in real life RFID systems. Subsequently existing trivial solutions to solve the scalability issues are 
discussed. After that an overview of the proposal has been given. This is followed by the 
technical details of our architecture. Finally, we describe the application of our scalable 
architecture in a practical scenario that is in emergency evacuation system. 
7.2. Existing Trivial Solutions 
A cell-based distributed architecture was proposed by A. Solanas et al. in [Solanas07]. In 
this paper an area is divided into cells, where each cell is assumed to be a square. Scalability is 
ensured by using information sharing protocol suites, though the system could be more scalable 
by assuming different structure cells. A single authentication operation to search a particular 
tagged object, in the system costs much computation. According to A. Solanas et al. in 
[Solanas07], tags capable of simple cryptographic computation can use improved randomized 
hash lock [Juels06], in a scalable manner to send its encrypted ID to the reader. Here, other 
authentication techniques can be used in addition to improved randomized hash lock. However, 
our proposal of using search protocols can achieve more scalability for the system. 
7.3. Proposed Solution 
In subsequent subsections, we will discuss the following major contributions: 
• We propose a distributed, hexagonal, cell based architecture, EDSA (Enhanced 
Distributed Scalable Architecture), which can be used for secured tag identification and tag 
searching without compromising scalability.  
• We point out the challenges of an emergency evacuation system.  
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• We also offer solutions to these challenges using EDSA and our proposed serverless 
search protocol.  
To the best of our knowledge, the integration of a serverless and a servered technique 
within the same architecture is addressed for the first time in this proposal. 
7.3.1. System architecture 
We propose a distributed architecture for large scale application where not only secure 
RFID authentication is needed, but also efficiency, cost-effectiveness and accuracy are great 
concerns. Our system is an improved version of the architecture of [Solanas07]. We try to 
alleviate the shortcomings of the architecture proposed in [Solanas07]. In our system, the use of a 
different cell structure provides more scalability than the one of [Solanas07]. 
RFID reader, tags and back end server are defined as main components of the system. 
Inclusion of back end server is completely different approach in comparison with the previous 
literature [Solanas07]. The tags are assumed to be passive. We also assume that the tags can 
compute simple one way hash functions and generate random numbers. Tags deployed in the 
system need to have enough non-volatile memory to execute the Enhanced Search Protocol and 
serverless authentication protocol [Ahamed08c]. We also assume that the mobility of the tags are 
enabled in our system i.e., tags can change their location at any time. 
In our system readers are static and active devices. They are capable of detecting the tags 
and performing crucial functions to do authentication and exploration of tags according to our 
serverless search protocols. To cover an area, readers are logically distributed. In [Solanas07], the 
area is divided into equal squares such that each square is covered by a single reader. However, 
hexagon is a better choice to partition the area. We refer to each hexagon as a cell. Hexagonal cell 
improves our system. Each single reader covers a specific cell. We also assume that our system 
facilitates a secure reader to reader communication channel. 
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The backbone of our system is a back-end server. It accesses the database of the ids of 
tags. On basis of requirements, the server can communicate with each reader while monitoring 
the system. In spite of having a back-end server, ours system does not comply with a centralized 
scheme. It is a servered as well as serverless scheme (see section 7.3.4). The functionalities of the 
back-end server and the readers are described in details later. Again we assume that the 
communication and exchanging of information between the server and the readers are performed 
through a secure communication channel. 
7.3.2. Coverage area 
In this section we describe the distribution of components in our system. The readers are 
spatially distributed and the tags are scattered among them. Consider an area & which can be 
covered by a couple of readers. We have two permitted points called ENtrance Point (ENP) and 
EXit Point (EXP) for tags to enter or exit the area  &, respectively. We assume all the readers are 
of same read range. The size of the cell, covered by each reader, is equal. 9 denotes the * cell 
of &. We consider 
& =   9  | 9 ∩ 91 = ∅,   ∀, D ∧   ≠ D 
Suppose, cell 9 is covered by reader 7. Also, :D7 is the set of readers adjacent to 
7. Next we describe some other related topics to point out how hexagonal cell improves our 
system. After that we again come to the improvement point (see section 7.3.5). 
7.3.3. Privacy and search 
Identification protocols of tags are vulnerable due to eavesdropping and other attacks. 
However, authentication protocols are more so protected than identification protocols. The 
authentication protocol proposed in [Ahamed08c] is indeed a secure protocol that never 
negotiates with privacy of both the reader and the tags. Therefore, the above mentioned serverless 
authentication protocol can be used in our system. 
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However, the use of authentication protocols to search a particular tag will raise 
scalability issues. Therefore we need to use secure search protocol for tag exploration in our 
system. Many real life applications, for example emergency evacuation system have an 
appreciable requirement for tag search. Even though the assortment of search protocol is limited, 
we have to incorporate a search protocol in our system. The enhanced search protocol [see 
chapter 6] is entirely appropriate for RFID systems it does not compromise privacy and security 
while searching for a tag. 
7.3.4. Protocols and functionalities 
In fact there will be three types of communications in our system. These are:  ↔


,  

 ↔  

 and 

 ↔ U − 0 
 
. We now point out the 
communication protocols those are to be used for the system. 
A. ¡ ↔ vwv 
Between tags and reader, there will be two types of functionalities. One is for 
authentication and other is for search. The authentication protocol proposed by [Ahamed08c] can 
serve the purpose of authentication between tag and reader. The enhanced search protocol serves 
the purpose of searching a tag. Since the protocols are proposed for a serverless reader, it seems 
to be implausible for the readers of this system. Here, each reader can perform like a serverless 
reader as well as a reader backed by a server. More about these readers are described below. 
B. vwv ↔ vwv 
A reader can share its information with adjacent readers. The shared information contains 
the  used for a tag along with the tag  and reader  of the reader which locates the 
particular tag within its cell. There is subtle difference between this shared information and 
ownership information of a reader [Ahamed08c]. From now on we refer to the shared information 
as Ownership Information in this context. Now, consider a reader 7 locates a tag 1 within 9. 
The ownership information is 0T¢A=N =  1 ∥ 1 ∥ 
 where, 1is the  for 1 stored in 
74 
7, 1 is the identifier of 1, 
 is the identifier of 7, and ∥ denotes concatenate. After 
authentication, 7 sends 0T¢A=N to reader 7 ∈ :D7. As a result, reader 7 stores 0T¢A=N in 
its contact list so that it can authenticate 1 whenever 1 enters 9 in future. 
Our EDSA system is a servered as well as serverless system, we here emphasize on its 
serverless property. 7¤¥¦ and 7¤§¦ indicate the readers of ENP and EXP respectively. The 
readers in the system need three protocols. A brief description of each protocol is given below.  
Arrival Protocol: This protocol starts when a tag first enters the system through ENP. At 
the very beginning all readers other than that at ENP own no tags, i.e., they all have empty 
contact lists. 7¤¥¦ (i.e. the reader at the entrance) is supposed to be authorized by back-end 
server for all possible tags which can enter the system through it. Whenever an authorized tag 1 
enters the system, after authentication, 7¤¥¦ sends0T¢¨©ª=N   to adjacent reader 7F which 
appends the ownership information in its contact list. Otherwise, 7¤¥¦ alerts the system about the 
attempt of an unauthorized tag. To roam into the system 1 has to move into cell 9F. Upon 
entering the cell, 7F locates 1 and authenticates it without any involvement of back-end server 
as 7F has ownership information in its contact list. Then 7F sends 0T¢A«=N  to all the adjacent 
readers :D7F and thus causes adjacent readers to be authorized for the tag 1. 
Roaming Protocol: This protocol sets off when a tag enters another cell equipped with a 
reader from the cell of its current reader. Whenever 1 enters the cell of the reader 7, it locates 
the tag  1. 7¬­F is the reader of the cell where 1 was before its detection by 7. Due to the 
spatial distribution of readers, 7 ∈ :D7¬­F and 7 contains 0T¢®¯«=N . Hence, 7 is 
authorized for 1. After authentication, 7 sends its ownership information 0T¢A=N to all adjacent 
readers :D7. Now depending on the information in its contact lists, each adjacent reader 7 
behaves differently. 
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a) If  7 ∈ :D7 ∩ :D7¬­F, 7 has to just replace 0T¢®¯«=N  with 0T¢A=N in its 
contact list.  
b) If 7 ∈ :D7 − :D7¬­F, 7 appends 0T¢A=N in its contact list. 
c) If 7 = 7¬­F, it changes its ownership information and passes on 0T¢A=N to its 
adjacent readers in :D7¬­F. Now each reader 7( adjacent to 7¬­F behaves in two different 
ways.  
c1) If 7( ∈ :D7 ∩ :D7¬­F, then do nothing. 
c2) If 7( ∈ :D7¬­F − :D7, it erases 0T¢®¯«=N  from its contact list. 
At the end of this protocol, only °7± ∪ :D7 readers know 0T¢A=N and only they have 
capability to authenticate the tag 1. Again, server is not involved for any responsibilities. 
Departure Protocol: Whenever a tag is about to exit the system through EXP, this 
protocol starts. When the tag 1 reaches the EXP to exit from the system, 7¤§¦ sends 0T¢¨³ª=N  to 
readers in :D7¤§¦ to erase ownership information because there is no chance to go back. 
Moreover, the previous owner (reader) propagates this information to its neighboring readers to 
remove ownership information of 1 from their contact lists. Hence nothing remains in the system 
about the departed tag. Therefore, we can appreciably refer the system as serverless despite the 
presence of a server. 
The dynamic way of authorizing readers for tags and removal of authority from readers 
implies that a reader has to deal with a moderate number of tags. Therefore system sustains its 
scalability. In fact, system can even be more scalable by incorporating hexagonal cell which we 
will describe later. 
C. vwv ↔ ´µ − v~w uv¶v 
Association of a back-end server strengthens the system and its efficiency. Therefore our 
system is now capable of performing in many real life applications. Our system is equipped with 
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a back-end server which can efficiently access the database of all the ids of the tags. The server 
can communicate with each reader as we’ve mentioned earlier. Server can authorize all readers. 
But it authorizes only 7¤¥¦ for tags. Server monitors the system constantly. 
As searching is unavoidable requirement for most real life application, the server can do a 
search whenever it faces a request from application. For simplicity, the server just sends a search 
request to all the readers in the system along with the id of the tag, 1, for which readers have to 
perform a search. However, not all the readers have ownership information related to 1.Only 
those readers who have ownership information can invoke search for 1 according to enhanced, 
while others remain silent. Whenever a reader locates 1 within its cell, it replies to the server 
with its consequence. Since we assume the communication between the reader and the server is 
performed through a secure channel, the reader can just send the successful search result. 
Otherwise, unsuccessful readers have to send fake messages to the server to fool an adversary. 
Through the search of a tag, server determines the cell in which the tag resides. This technique 
can be used in the application where locating or tracking of something is required. 
For this back-end server, we cannot refer our system as entirely serverless. Though the 
intervention of server is limited to some special purposes such as search, authorization, 
monitoring, etc., we can’t deny the presence of back-end server. 
7.3.5. Enhanced cell organization 
So far we have just mentioned the improvement of our system by organizing cell as 
hexagonal. Here we justify our claim. In fact, hexagonal cell based architecture, unlike the 
previous one [Solanas07], is another prominent feature of our system. 
Let  be the radius of that circle that circumscribes cell (hexagon or square) (see figure 
7.1 and figure 7.2) and  be the radius of the circle inscribed in a cell. As each reader has same 
read range, we assume read range is . 
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1. Depending on the mobility properties, a tag can be at different locations at different 
times. Therefore, for locating a tag, the readers face five different situations in case of square cell 
(see figure 7.2) and four different situations in case of hexagonal cell (see figure 7.1). Using 
square area as a cell, a tag can be located by at most four readers. However using hexagonal cell, 
a tag can be located by at most three readers. The use of hexagon cells reduces the 
communication traffic of the channel between the reader and the server, as fewer readers will 
reply in response of the server’s search request. 
2. |:D7| in a hexagonal cell organization is less than that in square cell organization. 
At a time, at most 7 readers know about a tag in case of hexagonal cell organization (see figure 
7.1). But in square cell organization at most 9 readers know about a single tag (see figure 7.2). In 
our system, whenever a tag changes its location from one cell to another, at most 3 readers have 
to insert the ownership information of the particular tag into their contact list and at most 3 
readers have to erase the information. While in previous system, at most 5 readers do insertion 
and at most 5 readers do deletion. Thus, our system ensures more scalability. 
 
Figure 7.1 The coverage of a set of readers while cell is hexagonal. Number denotes different tag 
location situations. 1 denotes only yz locates the tag. 2 denotes both yz and y· locate the 
tag. In position 3, yz, y· and y detect the tag. 4 indicates yz cannot locate the tag. 
3. Radio frequency is omnidirectional. So, a cell should be circular. But, practically 
circular cell will not be possible.  A hexagon has more resemblance to a circle than a square. In 
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fact, a precise hexagonal pattern is not used in all instances due to topographical limitations, local 
signal propagation conditions, and practical limitations on signal antennas. 
4. In square pattern the neighboring readers of a reader are not at an equal distance. Some 
neighbors are at o distance while others are at √2o distance. In contrast, all neighboring readers 
in hexagonal pattern are to be at equal distance o. This property resolves a shortcoming in 
communication between readers. 
 
Figure 7.2 Coverage of set of readers while cell is square. The numbers are used to indicate different 
tag location situations. 1 denotes only yz locates the tag. 2 denote both yz and y· locate 
the tag. In position 3, yz, yº and y» detect the tag. Location 4 meansyz, y·, yº and y locate 
the tag. 5 indicate yz cannot locate the tag. 
 
Figure 7.3 Overlapping area of two different cell patterns. 
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5. The common area between any two cells is referred to as overlapping area. A 
hexagonal pattern provides a reduced overlapping area. The area is reduced by ¼-q − ½q for a 
single cell (see figure 7.3). If tags are uniformly distributed in & and there are ¾ tags per unit area, 
then ¾¼-q − ½q amount of tags within a cell will neither be authenticated nor be found by more 
than one reader. 
The above justifications prove the enhancement of our system that uses hexagonal cell. 
7.4. Application of EDSA 
Emergency Evacuation System: Safety at the workplace and saving human lives in 
emergency situations has always been one of the highest priorities in all civilized countries. Fast 
and efficient evacuation of building complexes, and keeping account of all involved in 
unpredictable circumstances with hundreds or even thousands of people escaping from danger 
zones, is an essential component of any emergency system. In the case of emergency, 
conventional evacuation strategies rely on emergency authority (Fire Brigade, Police etc) to 
check each and every floor and to direct the personnel to come out of the building in the case of 
emergency situation. This approach has experienced limited success for safe and effective 
evacuation operation. A better mechanism or process is needed. Here we focus on some major 
issues and functionalities of an emergency evacuation system and how these can be accomplished 
through the usage of EDSA. 
The emergency evacuation system must be able to keep track of who is entering and 
leaving the system on a hands-free basis. It must cover all entrances/exits and handle people on a 
one-by-one basis or when rushing through in numbers. As there is no time for a personnel to think 
in which pocket he/she might have left the card to use it to exit the building in emergency case. It 
must automatically keep track of the whereabouts of all personnel and visitors within the building 
on 24/7 basis. Actually it has to know more specifically who has entered and if those who entered 
are still inside. 
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RFID system can be applied as a solution to the evacuation process and EDSA can be the 
appropriate architecture to be used in the system. Implementation of more than one ENP or EXP 
in EDSA, for more than one entrance or exit, is straight forward. To account for every personnel 
building occupants must have ID card, badge or other cards with embedded RFID tags. Even 
visitors should be equipped with such type of temporary cards so that they can also be accounted 
for in case of emergency situation. As a tag needs to be authenticated to enter the system, the 
ENPs of EDSA can be authorized by back-end server for all possible tags that can enter through 
them. The set of all possible tags may be comprised the tags for personnel as well as visitors. As 
all personnel and visitors have to enter the building, i.e., the system, through ENPs, it is straight 
forward to account for all humans. Those who have entered and who are still inside can be 
available to back-end server by getting information from contact lists of readers. Indeed, back-
end server can come to know about the sparse distribution of people throughout the whole 
building. The back-end server can keep track of whereabouts of people whenever necessary by 
executing a search operation with respective tags, because if a tag enters the system, it must be 
somewhere in the system until its departure. 
After the initialization of evacuating process, facility managers and first responders need 
to track the progress of the whole process in an easy approach. Monitoring can be possible by 
linking their PDAs or laptop computers with the back-end server. The software must display 
either the number of personnel left in the building or the names of those not yet accounted for. All 
these tasks must be updated in real time. Back-end server can provide total numbers of people left 
in the building, who are leaving the building through EXPs and who have not been accounted for. 
The software can request a search operation to back-end server which it passes on to all the 
readers for the respective tags. All the monitoring process including search operations can be 
done in real time. This allows first responders to know where to target their search and rescue 
efforts. Even by tagging rescuers before entering the emergency location, the back-end server can 
track them during evacuation process. 
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The automated system concept must be based on a 'hands-off' approach and require no 
user intervention upon entry or exit. In fact, EDSA pursues the hands-off approach. The protocols 
to facilitate the communication between readers indeed maintain this approach by insertion and 
deletion of ownership information. 
As buildings grow and workplace increase in size, the need for more sophisticated 
emergency systems grows. Accurate location information is essential to any emergency system 
and thus the implementation of EDSA is very important for the society. The possibility of damage 
to the system is beyond scope of this thesis. 
7.5. Summary 
RFID systems are used in selected industries for quite a few years now, yet there exists 
many applications of this technology. However, the question as to whether RFID systems will be 
widely used in the future depends on the strength of privacy protection and the improvement of 
performance features such as scalability. Unfortunately, there is a tradeoff between allowing 
scalability and ensuring security. In order to incorporate these two conflicting goals, we propose a 
hexagonal cell based distributed architecture using RFID tag identification which provides more 
scalability. In this architecture readers can co-operate with one another through a secure channel 
for scalable and secure tag identification. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proposal 
to integrate a serverless and a severed technique in the same architecture to enhance RFID system 
scalability. At the end of the chapter, we also illustrate the incorporation of EDSA in a real life 
example, such as emergency evacuation system, and discuss the capabilities of EDSA to 
overcome the challenges. 
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Chapter 8: Monitoring Missing WISP Tags in CRFID 
Networks  
8.1. Introduction 
The past decade has seen significant effort and progress towards the original ubiquitous 
applications. Particularly wireless sensor networks (WSNs) based on mote sensing platforms have 
been applied to many real-world problems. Remote monitoring applications have sensed animal 
behavior and habitat, structural integrity of bridges, volcanic activity, and forest fire danger 
[Hartung06], are to name only a few successes. Due to low power design and careful networking 
protocols these sensor networks had lifetimes measured in weeks or months, which were 
generally sufficient for the applications. Despite these successes, WSNs have not led to an 
approximation of sensing embedded in the fabric of everyday life, where walls, clothes, products, 
and personal items are all equipped with networked sensors. For this type of deployment, truly 
unobtrusive sensing devices are necessary. The size and finite lifetime of motes make them 
unsuitable for these applications. For the last few years, it is argued that Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) technology has a number of key attributes that make it attractive for such 
applications. RFID is a technology for automated identification of objects and people. But future 
RFID applications will require tags that can also perform minimal sensing, computation, and 
storage. One recent extension of RFID, Computational RFID (CRFID), presents exciting 
possibilities for ubiquitous computing applications. CRFID combines the advantages of RFID 
with those of sensor networks. 
Table 8.1 Comparison of different technologies 
 CPU Sensing Size (inches) Range Power Lifetime 
WSN (Mote) Yes Yes 3.0 x 1.3 x .82 (2.16 in3) Any Battery < 3 yrs 
RFID tag No No 6.1 x 0.7 x .02 (.08 in3) 30 ft Harvested indefinite 
CRFID (WISP) Yes Yes 5.5 x 0.5 x .10 (.60 in3) 10 ft harvested indefinite 
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As discussed, two technologies, wireless sensor networks and RFID, have been widely 
used to realize real-world applications. But CRFID presents the combination of both of these 
networks. The comparison of these three technologies is presented in table 8.1. 
In this chapter, we explore a third class of sensors that aims to provide the best of both 
worlds: RFID sensor networks based on Wireless Identification and Sensing Platforms (WISPs) 
[Sample08]. We consider the problem of how to accurately and efficiently monitor a set of WISP 
tags for missing tags. The task of monitoring for a missing WISP tag within a set of tags can be 
considered as a tag search approach. This is a special type of tag searching approach where the 
reader needs to monitor for missing tags and find out the tag that is missing.  
8.2. What is WISP? 
The Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) from Intel Research Seattle 
[Buettner08, Sample08] is an instance of CRFID. WISPs combine passive UHF RFID technology 
with traditional sensors. A current WISP is shown alongside a commercial UHF RFID tag and a 
common wireless sensor node (mote) in figure 8.1. WISPs have the capabilities of RFID tags but 
also support sensing and computation. Like any passive RFID tag, WISP is powered and read by 
a standard off-the-shelf  EPC “Gen 2” RFID reader, harvesting the power it uses from the reader's 
emitted radio signals. To an RFID reader, a WISP is just a normal EPC class-1 or gen-2 tag; but 
inside the WISP, the harvested energy is operating a 16-bit general purpose microcontroller. The 
microcontroller also has an analog to digital converter within itself. The microcontroller can 
perform a variety of computing tasks, including sampling sensors, and reporting that sensor data 
back to the RFID reader.  
WISP uses an integrated 802.15.4 radio for communication to talk with reader. WISPs 
can sense quantities such as light, temperature, acceleration, strain, and liquid level. Though the 
feasibility of WISPs has been discussed in some research literatures, how to harness many such 
devices to create a WISP sensor network is till now an open question. In near future, sensor 
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network will consists of multiple WISPs and one or more readers. Consequently, realizing a full-
scale network will require development at both the WISP and the reader end, because new 
protocols and techniques must be developed unlike those of either RFID or WSNs.  
 
Source: [Buettner09] 
Figure 8.1 A standard UHF Class 1 Gen 2 RFID tag, Intel WISP, and Telos Mote (left to right) 
While WISPs are currently assembled from discrete components that have a cost of 
roughly $25, they are intended to be mass manufactured like RFID tags at price points closer to 
$1 [Buettner09]. One disadvantage of using the WISP tags is that they need to be placed within 1-
2 meters of the reader. 
8.3. Research Problem of WISP Networks 
For simple RFID sensor networks, the data of interest is simply each tag’s identity. 
However, for WISP sensor networks, it is difficult to develop efficient protocols for gathering 
sensor data that changes over time. With RFID, the reader is able to transmit messages to all the 
tags and the tags can re-transmit messages to the reader. Currently, WISP tags with new sensor 
data must wait until they are interrogated by a reader. This increases the likelihood of many 
WISP tags wanting to use the bandwidth limited channel at the same time when replying to the 
reader query. However, the standard RFID strategy of identifying and then communicating with 
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each device is wasteful as only some devices would have relevant data. Because of all these 
differences, the trivial RFID protocols securing RFID network cannot be applied or even adapted 
to WISP sensor network.  
Let’s consider a WSN deployed in a battlefield. Quick response time of sensor network 
along with high data accuracy and integrity is very important in such networks. A reader might 
have hundreds of accelerometer WISPs in its field of view. Because all the WISPs share a single 
reader channel, the update rate per tag would be very low if every tag were simply queried for 
sensor data sequentially. At any given moment, the reader may want to find out whether all the 
tags are present in the battlefield or not. The reader may also want to find out the particular WISP 
tag that is missing from the battlefield.  
There are two kinds of methods used to solve this type of problems. One is ALOHA 
based algorithms and the other one is tree-based algorithms [Fin03]. The ALOHA based 
algorithms reduce the probability of tag collisions since tags are scheduled to transmit at distinct 
times. However, with the increase of the number of tags, the identification performance will be 
deteriorated sharply. We propose to apply Slotted ALOHA based technique to solve this problem. 
8.4. Motivation 
Let us consider WISP network installed in a hospital to monitor patients who are in ICU 
(Intensive Care Unit). ICU patients are usually in a very critical situation (i.e. they are out of any 
kind of movement) and they are kept in ICU for a very small period of time (for example 3-4 
days). But patients in ICU need special care. They are treated with highest medical facilities and 
devices. For these types of patients, one important fact that the doctors look for is the quality and 
quantity of sleep of each patient. WISP tags have accelerometer and it can be attached with the 
patients’ mattress/bed to monitor for sleep quality. These WISP tags can also be used to collect 
other information such as, surrounding sound, temperature, air density, identification of patient, 
etc. In this scenario, the reader installed in the ICU may need to perform two tasks: 
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Task 1. Monitor for any missing WISP tag in the ICU (it can be an indication of 
administration error or life threat from any enemy of the patient). The goal of this task is to find 
out the tag that is missing within the system. 
Task 2. Collect data of the WISP tags to monitor for patient’s state. The goal of this task 
is collect the sensor data from all the existing WISP tags of the systems and pass it to the server 
for further processing.  
The technique of determining patient’s health and environment status from the collected 
raw data is done by the server and it is out of the scope of this thesis. Next we investigate the 
methodologies that can be used to perform the above mentioned two tasks. 
Hospital authority could first attach a WISP tag to each object/person to be monitored. 
Each tag contains a unique id which is recorded and stored on a secure server. The authority then 
deploys a Gen 2 reader to periodically collect all the ids from the tags and match them against the 
ids stored on server. This way, the doctor can be immediately notified of any errors. We term this 
simple approach as collect all. However, collect all suffers from two drawbacks.  
First, collecting tag ids for comparison is time consuming when there are a lot of tags due 
to presence of collisions. A reader collects ids by first broadcasting the number of available time 
slots. Each tag will independently pick a time slot to reply. When multiple tags pick the same slot, 
a collision occurs and the reader obtains no information and must repeat the process again. When 
the set of tags is large, the number of collisions will rise, increasing the data collection time. The 
increase of data collection time may have an adverse effect on patients’ lives since ICU patients 
needs to be observed continuously. The system response delay of 1 to 2 minute can cause serious 
vulnerabilities to the patients’ lives at ICU. 
Second, collect all requires the WISP tags to reply their sensor data values in a second 
round of message. This increases the communications cost of the system. 
In this chapter, we consider the problem of accurately and efficiently monitoring for 
missing WISP tags. We assume that the gen 2 reader interacts with the tags and passes the 
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collected information to the server. The server will do further processing and will issue a warning 
if there are any missing tags. Our approach is unique in a sense that the tags will reply with their 
identification and data (i.e. sensor data) at the same pass of message. This technique reduces the 
communication cost drastically when there is large number of tags in the system. 
8.5. Existing Works on WISP 
The existing literatures on CRFID based security are not much extensive. However, 
extensive works have been done to secure RFID sensor networks and sensor networks in general. 
Next we discuss some important literatures on sensor network security and WISP security that are 
relevant to this chapter. 
In the recent years, wireless sensor network security problem [Chan03] has been able to 
catch the attentions of a number of researchers around the world. Wood et al. [Wood02] studies 
DoS attacks against different layers of sensor protocol stack. JAM [Wood03] presents a mapping 
protocol which detects a jammed region in the sensor network and helps to avoid the faulty region 
to continue routing within the network, thus handles DoS attacks caused by jamming. [Wang06] 
presents a brief summary of various security schemes of wireless sensor networks proposed so 
far. Recently, Abdelzaher et al. have started research on sensor networks to investigate network 
protocols, services, and programming paradigms tailored to the Cyber physical system involving 
sensors and RFID tags (excluding WISP tags) [Zaher]. However, these techniques are not suitable 
for WISP sensor networks because of different architecture, operating platform, sensing 
technique, and new challenges introduced by WISP tags.  
So far, the security aspects of WISP sensor network have not been explored in literature 
extensively since the usage of these tags are still a new technology. However, [Czeskis08] 
presents an overview of low power wireless security research for WISP enabled RFID network. 
[Intel] provides information of the entire WISP related literatures that have been proposed so far. 
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But, most of these literatures focus on the improvement of power aware parameters of WISP 
sensor network. 
In CRFID networks collision occurs when multiple WISP tags try to transmit data to a 
reader at the same time. This results in the reader being unable to obtain any useful information. 
Works [Bonuccelli06, Cha05, Lee05, and Micic05] have been done to improve the protocols to 
reduce collisions, and secure search techniques to isolate particular tags [Tan07] one at a time. 
While these techniques improve monitoring performance, such solutions are ultimately bounded 
by the number of tags. Regardless of the protocol used, the RFID reader will still have to isolate 
each tag at least once to obtain data. Our approach does not require the reader to isolate every tag. 
8.6. Proposed Solution 
We make the following contributions in this chapter ─ 
• We propose the notion of tag monitoring which is a new dimension of tag searching 
for a WISP tag based network. 
• We propose a tag monitoring protocol that does not require the reader to collect ids 
from each WISP tag, but is still able to accurately monitor for missing tags. 
• Our monitoring technique provides privacy protection by neither broadcasting tag ids 
in public, nor revealing ids to the reader. 
• Our technique is unique as it allows the WISP tags to reply their sensor data in the 
same pass of message in which the tag identification data is replied. 
• To the best of our knowledge, the tag searching/monitoring technique for the WISP 
based network is proposed for the first time in this thesis. 
8.6.1. Problem definition 
In our system, we assume that a server has a group of objects, and a WISP tag with a 
unique id is attached to each object. We refer to this group of objects as a set of tags. A set of tags 
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once created is assumed to remain static. It means that no tags are added to or removed from the 
set. We consider this set of tags to be “intact’’ if all the tags in the set are physically present 
together at the same time.  
8.6.2. Protocol goals 
The goal of a server is to remotely, quickly, and accurately determine whether a set of 
WISP tags is intact. The server first instructs a reader to scan all the tags to collect a Bit Record 
(S7). The server then uses this result to determine whether there are any missing tags. Our 
protocols succeed if the server is able to determine a set of tags is not intact when any of the tag is 
missing.  
8.6.3. Attack model 
The goal of the adversary is to steal RFID tags. The adversary launches the attack by 
physically removing tags from the set. We do not consider more involved attacks such as “clone 
and replace”. In such an attack, the adversary steals some tags, clones the stolen tags to make 
replicate tags, and replaces the replicate tags back into the set. Cloning creates replicate tags that 
are identical to the stolen tags. In this scenario, the server cannot detect any missing tags since the 
replicate tags are identical to the removed tags. In our proposal, the adversary simply attempts to 
steal some tags. Once the tags are stolen, the tags are assumed to be out of the range of the reader. 
Therefore, when a reader issues a query, the stolen tags will not reply. 
We denote an adversary is denoted as :P. The adversary can control a number of readers 
and tags. Each reader and tag controlled by :P is denoted as 7Qand Q , respectively. We assume that 
all the entities (tags, readers, TC including adversary, adversarial readers and adversarial tags) 
have polynomially bounded resources. 
8.6.4. Preliminaries 
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We consider an RFID reader, 7, and a set of ¿ WISP tags,  ∗. The TC is a trusted party 
who deploys all the WISP tags and authorizes any reader. For the sake of simplicity we assume 
that R and TC communicate through a secure channel. We assume that an RFID reader is able to 
distinguish the slots with no reply, single reply, or multiple replies. We define these slots as 
empty slot, single-reply slot, or collision slot respectively. We denote the frame size as f and the 
random number generated by reader/tag as r. The server contains a table of tag entries. Each entry 
of the table contains the corresponding tag id. Table 8.2 summarizes the remaining notations. 
Table 8.2 Notations for MonAC protocol 
Symbol Meaning 
  ∗ Set of RFID tags 
7 RFID Reader 

 Random number 
¿ Number of tags within T*  ℎ.  One way hash function 
& Slot position within frame 
S7 Bit Record generated by the reader with the replies of tags 
_ Encrypted sensor data 

_ Raw sensor data 

VÁÂ_
0 Reply sent by the tags 
8.6.5. MonAC (Monitor And Collect) protocol 
In this section, we present our Monitor And Collect protocol, MonAC, where the gen 2 
reader is assumed to be always honest. Given a set of WISP tags, MonAC returns a Bit Record to 
the server to check if the set of tags is intact and to let the server collect the sensor values. 
In our protocol, we assume that WISP tags resolve collisions using a slotted ALOHA 
type scheme. The reader first broadcasts a frame size and a random number, , 
, to all the tags. 
Each tag uses the random number r and its id to hash to a Slot Position, &, between [1, f] where  
& = ℎ⨁
 mod  
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In order to raw send the sensor data, 
_, in the same slot, each tag creates an 
encrypted version of the sensor data, _ , in the following way: 
_ = ℎ⨁
_ 
Finally tag send the data, _, in the slot position SP. Tags that successfully transmit 
their data are instructed to keep silent. Tags that pick the same slot to reply will be informed by 
the reader to retransmit in subsequent rounds where the reader will send a new , 
. The reader 
repeats this process until all tag ids are collected. 
We modify the slot picking behavior used in collect all so that instead of having a tag 
pick a slot and return its id, we let the tag reply with the encrypted sensor data value _, 
signifying the tag has chosen that slot. In other words, instead of the reader receiving 
°· · ·  | 1 | 0 | 6 | UTÁÁT0 |  UTÁÁT0  |  · · ·±, 
where 0 indicates no tag has picked that slot to reply, and collision denotes multiple tags 
trying to reply in the same slot, the reader will receive  
°· · ·  | 
_ | 0 | 
_ | UTÁÁT0 |  UTÁÁT0 |  · · ·±. 
After receiving the replies, the reader can insert a random number, r, in the collision slot. 
From the reply, the reader can generate the bit string 
S7 =  °· · ·  | 
_ | 0 | 
_ | 
 | 
 |  · · ·±. 
This is more secure since the tag is not returning its id, and the sensor data is sent in 
encrypted form which seems purely random to the adversary. Our protocol exploits the fact that a 
low cost RFID tag picks a reply slot in a deterministic fashion. Thus, given a particular random 
number 
 and frame size , a tag will always pick the same slot to reply. The server knows all the 
ids in a set, as well as the parameters , 
). Therefore, the server will be able to determine the 
resulting BR for an intact WISP tag set ahead of time. However, the server will know that it is 
supposed to get a random number in the collision slots and random number alike sensor data in 
other slot positions where corresponding to a tag presence.  
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From the reply of the reader, the server can generate a new Bit Record, S7F<­, 
S7F<­ =  °· · ·  | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1| 1 |  · · ·± 
The intuition behind our protocol is to let the server pick a , 
 for the reader to 
broadcast to the set of tags. The server then compares the S7 returned by the reader with the 
S7F<­ generated from the server’s records. A match will indicate that the set is intact. The server 
can collect the sensor data values corresponding to each tag from the S7 returned by the reader. 
Algorithm 1: Interaction between server and reader( 7) 
1. Server sends , 
 to the reader 7 
2. R executes Algorithm 4 
3. All nearby tags executes Algorithm 3 
4. Calculate S7)<4Å<4 for all tags  ∗ 
5. Receive S7 from 7 
6. for  =  1 ∶   do 
7.     if S7 ! = 0 then 
8.          assign S7F<­  = 1 
9. if S7)<4Å<4 == S7F<­ then 
10.           ÁÁ  
 V
0 
11.  else 
12.           UT
VT00 T ℎ Uℎ0  
        VTT0 T S7  0 
Figure 8.2 Algorithm for interaction between server and reader in MonAC protocol 
Algorithm 2: Interaction between WISP tags and reader 7 
1. Reader broadcasts , 
 to all tags  ∗ 
2. Each tag  executes Alg. 3 
3. Reader executes Alg. 4 
4. Reader returns S7 to the server 
Figure 8.3 Algorithm for interaction between WISP tags and reader in MonAC protocol 
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm executed by WISP tags 
1. Receive , 
 from 7 
2. for Each tag Ti (where i = 1 to N) do 
3.       compute & = ℎ⨁
 mod  
4.       compute _ = ℎ⨁
_ 
5. while R broadcasts Slot Position (&) do 
6.        if  (SP = = SPi) then 
7.                return _ to R 
Figure 8.4 Algorithm executed by WISP tags in MonAC protocol 
Algorithm 4: Algorithm executed by reader 7 
1. compute S7 of length  
2. Initialize all entries of S7 to 0 
3. for Slot Position & = 1 T  do 
4.       Broadcast & and listen for reply 
5.       if 
VÁÂ_
0 ! =  UTÁÁT0 do 
6.                S7Ç&È = 
VÁÂ 
7.      else  
8.                S7Ç&È = 
 
9. return S7 to the server 
Figure 8.5 Algorithm executed by the reader in MonAC protocol 
The reader uses a various , 
 pair each time he wants to check the intactness of  ∗. 
The server can either communicate a new , 
 each time the reader executes MonAC, or the 
server can issue a list of different , 
 pairs to the reader ahead of time. 
Alg. 1 shows the overall interaction between the reader and the server. Each tag in the set 
executes Algorithm. 2 independently. The reader executes Algorithm. 3 to generate the S7 and 
return it to the server. Notice that unlike the collect all method which requires several rounds to 
collect the tag information, our MonAC algorithm only requires a single round. Furthermore, in 
Algorithm. 3 Line 7 the tag does not need to return the tag id to the reader. Rather the tag sends 
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the encrypted sensor value (that seems random to the attacker) to inform the reader of its 
presence. This reduces the communication cost since a second round of messages is not required 
to send the sensor data to the reader.  
8.6.6. Protocol description 
In MonAC protocol, there are two phases of operation. One is Monitor phase and the 
other is Collect phase. In the Monitor phase, the server monitors for the missing tags. In the 
Collect phase, the server collects the sensor data for further processing. Next we discuss the 
details of two phases. 
Monitor Phase: The reader first broadcasts a frame size and a random number, (f, r), to 
all the tags. Each WISP tag  uses its own tag  and r to generate & = ℎ⨁
 mod  . At 
the same time, each tag calculates its own sensor data, _ = ℎ⨁
_. When the slot 
position broadcasted by the reader matches with &, tag  replies _ in that slot position to 
the reader. At the time of receiving replies from different tags, the reader checks the content of 
slot position &. After receiving replies from all the tags, the reader forms the Bit Record (BR) of 
length f (frame size) to transmit to the server. Initially reader assigns 0 to all the slot positions. 
However, the reader stores 
VÁÂ_
0 in those slot positions where it receives a reply. The 
reader stores a random number in the slot position where it receives a collision. This technique of 
bit assignment allows our search protocol to be secured against some major attacks which we will 
discuss in next section.  The S7 is then transmitted to the server. We assume that the channel 
between the server and the reader is secure. We also assume that the frame size (f) is large enough 
and there are more slot positions within the frame than total number of tags (i.e.  >  ¿). 
The server calculates Bit Record, S7)<4Å<4, for all the tags ahead of time. After receiving 
S7 from the reader, the server stores 1 in those positions of S7 where there is no 0. Let this new 
Bit Record be S7F<­. Next, the server compares between S7F<­ and S7)<4Å<4. If these two Bit 
Records do not match, the server becomes sure that at least one of the tags is missing. The server 
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can find out the slot position of the missing tag. The server can look up the table to find out the  
of the missing tag corresponding to mismatched slot position.  
Collect Phase: Collect phase is executed by the server after Monitor phase is over. In this 
phase, the server collects sensor data for all the existing tags. The server determines the raw 
sensor data from the 
VÁÂ_
0 corresponding to each tag. The 
VÁÂ_
0 is an encrypted 
form of the raw sensor data. However only the server can determine the correct raw sensor value 
as the server knows s for different tags. Therefore, the server can compute the hash of the , 
i.e. ℎ. Then the server can XOR the hash, ℎ, with the _ to collect the 
_. 
8.7. Protocol Analysis 
In this section, we analyze our proposed search protocol against different types of attacks. 
8.7.1. Security analysis 
Privacy Preservation: Our protocol can preserve the privacy of individual WISP tag. The 
adversary is not able to find out the original sensor data. Each tag replies with an encrypted 
sensor data, ℎ⨁
_ which can be decrypted only by the server. Since the server only 
knows the  of different tags, only it can compute the hash value. Therefore, none but the server 
can decrypt the encrypted sensor data to collect the raw data. 
Tracking: MonAC is resistant against tracking. Let an adversary :P eavesdrops on the 
transaction between a reader 7 and tags. So he/she knows the queries and replies. But he/she will 
not be able to reverse compute the replies or learn the query but the adversary can certainly be 
sure that a monitoring has taken place. However, the attacker cannot be able to figure out which 
tag replied in which slot. Since outputs of all tags will seem to be pure random to the adversary. 
Eavesdropping: Here :P observes all the queries between a reader and tags. And his/her 
goal is to use the data to impersonate a fake reader  7 or a fake tag 1. Our protocol is powerful 
against this attack. In our protocol :P will not be able to find out the expected reply of the tags. 
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:P will not be able to find out any relation between the Slot Positions and tag replies. In each 
monitoring pass, all tags will pick a different slot based on the random number sent by the reader. 
:P can only observe the data send by the reader and the tags. But :P will not be able to link the 
queries of two parties. :P will not be able to decrypt or even replay the messages. Therefore, :P 
cannot impersonate  7 or 1. Therefore by eavesdropping :P cannot launch a replay attack by 
using previous values. 
8.8. Summary 
In this chapter, we introduced the concept of WIPS tags. We discussed some specific 
applications of WISP based networks (i.e. ICU of a hospital) and try to provide security solutions 
for them. We considered a unique issue of CRFID based systems, the problem of monitoring for 
missing WISP tags. We proposed a secure protocol to monitor for missing tags and also for 
collecting different sensor values of WISP tags. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
proposal to address the tag monitoring issue for WISP based networks. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Future Works 
In this chapter, we summarize the contributions of the thesis and identify some future 
research directions. 
9.1. Research Achievements 
RFID technology is increasingly being deployed in diverse applications ranging from 
inventory management to anti-counterfeiting protection. Nonetheless, RFID tags have yet to 
supplant the ubiquitous barcode found on almost every grocery product. This slow adoption is 
partly due to the security and privacy concerns over the pervasive deployment of RFID tags. This 
security and privacy concerns are mostly addressed by RFID authentication protocols. However, 
the aim of this thesis was to address the security and scalability challenges of RFID tag searching 
and to devise new solutions. Next, we summarize our contribution in this thesis. 
• Attack Summary: This thesis focuses on RFID search protocols that ensure strong 
security and scalability. We summarized all the possible attacks that can be launched against 
RFID systems. 
• Security and Performance Requirements: We addressed the security and 
performance requirements that should be guaranteed by RFID protocols to protect against the 
major security attacks.  
• Secure Serverless Search Protocol (S3PR): We proposed a lightweight, secure, and 
serverless search protocol for RFID systems. The unique feature of this protocol is that it is 
serverless and it is not vulnerable to single point-of-failure. This protocol requires the tags to be 
able to compute hash function and generate pseudo random numbers. 
• Secure Scalable Search Protocol (S-Search): We proposed a secure and scalable 
RFID tag search protocol for large scale RFID system using Slotted ALOHA based technique. 
This is a highly scalable search protocol that can be used in large scale RFID systems. This 
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protocol is very lightweight since it requires the tags to be able to perform hash function and 
XOR operation. 
• Enhanced Distributed Scalable Architecture (EDSA): We addressed the tradeoff 
between scalability and security. From this perspective, we proposed a hexagonal cell based 
distributed scalable architecture for RFID tag searching in an emergency evacuation system. We 
compared our architecture with its prior work and proved that our hexagonal cell structure 
increases the performance of the RFID system.  
• Monitor and Collect Protocol (MonAC): We introduced the concept of monitoring 
missing tags. We propose a new dimension of tag searching, i.e. tag monitoring technique 
(MonAC) for a WISP tag based network. MonAC protocol does not require the reader to collect 
ids from each WISP tag but it is still able to accurately monitor for missing WISP tags.  
9.2. Future Directions 
• For S3PR protocol, in future, we plan to simulate the protocols with a large number of 
tags to see how it performs. We are also interested in finding the lower bounds for the tag's 
computational requirements for secure RFID communications. 
• For S-Search protocol, we plan to extend our protocol to search multiple RFID tags 
simultaneously. 
• This thesis only considers RFID protocols that can perform hash function and can 
generate random numbers. However, there are tags that do not have such capability. So designing 
secure search protocols for those tags is also desirable. 
• There could be many attacks on RFID systems that we have not addressed in this 
thesis. Thus, further study of such protocols and possible attacks on them would be desirable. 
• We have assumed that the channel between the back-end server and the reader is 
secure. Hence, we have not dealt with security threats arising on that channel. However, in some 
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applications, server-reader communications may be insecure, e.g. they may use a wireless 
channel. Thus, secure search protocols over this channel should be studied further. 
• In future, we would like to provide formal security proofs for the protocols proposed 
in this thesis. 
• We would also like to perform simulation in future to investigate a feasible Spatial 
Density for the MonAC protocol. We would like to determine whether the reader can maintain 
reasonable WISP motion detection rates even when large numbers of tags are active in front of it. 
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Appendix A 
Glossary of Terms 
Term Definition 
Pervasive computing 
Pervasive computing provides an environment where information 
and services can be accessed remotely from the environment 
specially through wireless technologies 
RFID systems RFID is an abbreviation of Radio Frequency IDentification. It is a 
data collection technology that uses electronic tags for storing data. 
RFID tags 
A microchip attached to an antenna that is packaged in a way that it 
can be applied to an object. The tag picks up signals from and sends 
signals to a reader. The tag contains a unique serial number. 
Reader 
A device used to communicate with RFID tags. The reader has one 
or more antennas, which emit radio waves and receive signals back 
from the tag. 
Gen 2 
The second generation air interface for communication between an 
RFID reader and tag, administered by EPC global Inc. It deals with 
the modulation scheme, packet structure, command language and 
methods for dealing with collision. 
WISP 
WISP stands for Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform. 
WISPs have the capabilities of RFID tags, but also support sensing 
and computing. 
Security Process of creating a computing platform that ensures only allowed 
actions are performed. 
Scalability 
A network protocol is said to be scalable if the number of nodes can 
be significantly increased without imposing an unacceptable 
workload on any entity in the network. 
Anonymity Anonymity is the state of not being identifiable within a set 
Lightweight 
Cryptography 
Cryptographic operations that require low computational and 
processing power to be performed 
Serverless System An RFID system consisting of tags and readers but without a central database 
Eavesdropping Eavesdropping is the act of secretly listening to the private 
conversation between two parties 
Nonce A random number that never repeats its value 
 
 
